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The Science of the Indirect Approach in Modern War. 
Resurrection of an Art forgotten? 
PROLOGUE 
Previous to my successful enrollment in this post-graduate programme, I had the 
opportunity of studying Business Administration as an undergraduate student. 
Besides learning about finance, accounting and marketing, all our professors were 
always straining to instill to us that the most important element of an enterprise are 
its people. Start-up business taking smart decisions could become giants in the 
international arena of commerce within very short periods of time whereas giant 
enterprises could very easily file for bankruptcy despite all their financial prowess. 
It was a paradox left insolvent to my curious mind until I came across the same 
phenomenon in the conduct of warfare, during this post-graduate programme. 
History offered many examples in which great armies, technologically and 
logistically superior were defeated by smaller and inferior opponents. As such, my 
interest in studying this paradox grew exponentially due to the fact that I come from 
a very small country, Cyprus which has been in conflict with a superior adversary, 
Turkey, for almost half a century now.  
Could it be possible that my country’s national problem be solved through the 
application of this Indirect Approach method, if the situation ever evolved from a 
political confrontation into a military one? Whilst it would require a number of 
hypotheses to materialize in order to view the practical result of this scenario, the 
Indirect Approach theory remains a science that will definitely re-emerge in the 
modern battlefields of the 21st century, most likely as the favorite method of 
adversaries with an unequal access to resources and different cultural 
idiosyncrasies. It should be noted though that the Indirect Approach theory can also 
be applied successfully by states that are technologically superior, only when these 
states come to realize the full potential that the Indirect Approach theory holds. 
Only through a critical analysis of the Indirect Approach theory, we can result in 
comprehending holistically the Indirect Approach theory and thus applying it 
successfully in modern battlefields. 
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-  CHAPTER 1  - 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Failure is the key to success; 
Each mistake teaches us something.  
(Morihei Ueshiba, 1992, The Art of Peace, p. 87) 
 
1.1 Background  
Despite of all the technological prowess that we have managed to accumulate, we 
continue to treat war foolhardily as a trade rather than as a science. The 
consequences of forgetting the answer to the question of whether war is a trade or 
a science, is succumbing us in a repetitive mode of failure. (Maurice De Saxe, 1757, 
p. 29) The trend of technological evolution being chained to the science of war has 
subjected our minds into the condition of ‘target fixation’. Target fixation regards 
to the phenomenon in which an individual or a group of people, become so focused 
on an observed object that they inadvertently increase their chances of colliding 
with the object. (Cummins, 2013) In a parallel line of thought, the phenomenon of 
target fixation is responsible for the friction and the inertia that is observed 
whenever a new concept of conducting warfare emerges in military affairs.   
The emergence of the Indirect Approach theory cannot be specified with 
chronological accuracy as it is a concept that has not been analyzed through the 
scientific way, thus allowing historians to successfully categorize events as those 
that fall or not under the method of the IA theory. As a result of the lack of a 
scientific approach to the method of the IA theory, this research will both introduce 
and deconstruct the concept of the IA theory through both an academic and 




Liddell Hart, later renowned as the father of the IA theory, had come to the advent 
of the IA concept after a diligent examination of war’s “elementary principles 
drawn from the sum of human experience in all times.” (Hart, 1944, p. 90) Hart was 
appalled from the strategic and tactical stalemates that he had observed during 
WWI. Hart did not provide an exact definition of the IA theory, but the closest to a 
definition of the IA theory, lies in the preface of his book ‘The Way to Win Wars’, 
published in 1941 in which he stated that: “In commerce, the suggestion that there 
is a deal to be secured is far more potent than any direct appeal to buy. And in any 
sphere, it is proverbial that the surest way of gaining a superior’s acceptance of a 
new idea is to persuade him that it is his idea! As in war, the aim is to weaken 
resistance before attempting to overcome it; and the effect is best attained by 
drawing the other party out of his defenses.” (pp. 5-6)  
As Hart commented later in the same book, at the heart of the IA theory lie two 
basic principles, dislocation and exploitation. For success on the battlefield, these 
two principles are to be used consecutively. In Hart’s own words: “One precedes 
and one follows the actual blow, which in comparison is a simple act. You cannot 
hit the enemy with effect unless you have first created the opportunity; you cannot 
make that effect decisive unless you exploit the second opportunity that comes 
before he can recover.” (1941, pp. 180) In essence, the IA theory suggests the 
opposite than the generally accepted belief of success being the sum of accidental 
events. It is the opportunities that an entity creates and the exploitation of these 
opportunities that lead to success. Finally, the IA theory comes in parallel with the 
notion of exploitation of asymmetric outcomes, which Taleb (2007, p. 210) defines 
as “I will never get to know the unknown since, by definition, it is unknown. 
However, I can always guess how it might affect me, and I should base my 
decisions around that.” 
Hart’s IA theory came under scrutiny on the other hand because it was not produced 
through the scientific route. This unscientific approach towards the IA theory has 
been confirmed by Freedman’s statement regarding Hart’s positioning on the 
subject of the IA, for which Freedman stated that: “Unfortunately, his approach to 
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history was intuitive and eclectic rather than, as he liked to believe, scientific.” 
(2013, ch.11, p. 138) Another of Hart’s critics, Bond (1976, p. 56) commented on 
the same subject stating that: “Liddell Hart came extremely close to a circular 
argument: by his definition, a decisive victory was an event which is secured by an 
indirect approach.” Freedman (2013, ch.11, p. 134-139) also remarked on this when 
he stressed Hart’s rigidity as a result of the way Hart approached the subject of the 
IA theory. 
This research intends to permeate the IA theory through the employment of three 
different theories, Chaos theory, OODA Loop theory and Reflexive Control theory. 
Since first encountering the IA theory, I became preoccupied in discovering the 
academic tools and techniques that would allow me to unravel the inner 
mechanisms of the IA theory. Hart’s books on the specific subject were saturated 
with philosophy, making the IA theory much more difficult to comprehend in 
depth. On the other hand, a good grasp of human psychology seemed a possible 
key for deciphering Hart’s work on the IA theory, basically because Hart 
emphasized the importance of human factor in the conduct of warfare. Researching 
more on the IA theory, I came upon the discoveries of the three theories, mentioned 
above. Chapter three that examines T.E Lawrence’s Arab Revolt and chapter four 
that examines Wingate’s expeditions in Sudan, Palestine, Ethiopia and Burma were 
chosen because they depicted exactly the utilization of the IA theory through the 
combination of Chaos theory, OODA Loop theory and Reflexive Control theory. 
1.2 Research Aim and Intentions 
The central aim of this research divides in two parts. The first part is devoted in 
showing that the IA theory’s two basic maxims, dislocation and exploitation are 
attained through the practice of Chaos theory, OODA theory and Reflexive Control 
theory. The second part is devoted to showing that the IA theory is the most 
appropriate method in reaching equilibrium of force, a state that guarantees the non-
continuation of war between conflicting parties.  However, the degree of simplicity 
that this central aim might suggest, shadows the supplementary intentions of this 
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research project which are the demonstration of IA theory’s practical utilization and 
efficacy in past and future asymmetric or not, environments. 
In one of Hart’s last works, in which he approached war from a philosophical 
perspective, Hart remarked that history illustrated, that complete and lasting victory 
has never been achieved. (1971, p. 83) On the contrary, one’s victory is one’s loss 
and this process has always led to further continuation of the phenomenon of war. 
Smith (2005, p. 284), concentrated on providing an answer to this problem, 
practically invented the term: ‘equilibrium of force’. Equilibrium of force is a term 
parallel to the one used in the field of physics. In physics, a state of equilibrium 
suggests that the sum of all forces, each force being a vector, is zero. In order then 
to attain equilibrium of force in war, one must previously take into account and try 
to predict how all physical and non-physical features of a phenomenon such as war 
will conduct with each other. Once again, laws of physics cannot be escaped. “As 
Newton’s third law of motion puts it, ‘For every action there is an equal and 
opposite reaction.’ (Thornton, 2007, p. 23) The IA theory offers the ability of taking 
a much more holistic approach to the phenomenon of war. The lack of this holistic 
approach might be the crucial element that will help attain a faster elimination of 
war’s consequences and ultimately, the non-continuation of war. 
1.3 Theoretical Hypotheses 
1. Are the principles of dislocation and exploitation yielded by the synergy of 
Chaos theory, OODA theory and Reflexive Control theory? 
 
2. Can the idea of victory be fractal to the concept of the state of equilibrium?  
1.4 Value of this Research 
Despite modern society’s inclination towards the plannable, the accumulated 
history of humanity, proves Heraclitus comment that “τὰ πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν 
μένει” (everything is in constant flow and nothing stand stills) (Heraclitus, 2010 
edition, p. 45) is closer to being a law than a mere observation. What does then, this 
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research has to offer to its reader? To whom this research can be found valuable 
and why is it important?  
Firstly, an opportunity to examine the IA theory from a completely different 
perspective, that encompasses concepts drawn from such a broad background that 
involves history, physics, mathematics, psychology and philosophy. This research 
does not only try to deconstruct the IA theory into its core mechanisms, but it also 
tries to prove that the theory is practically feasible and efficacious in modern 
battlefields. In the interminable quest of the perfect formula in the conduct of 
warfare, the IA theory might be the finest prize that has simply been excursed on 
the grounds of incomprehensibility. Coming to the second part of the question set 
above, this research, will be found valuable especially to people with military 
backgrounds, because as insofar, no other research has investigated the synergistic 
relationship between Chaos theory, OODA Loop theory and Reflexive Control 
theory.  
On the other hand, this research will provide business executives with food for 
thought as many of the theories that will be used for deconstructing the IA theory 
can be applied with few alterations in the business environment. Finally, the value 
of this research remains critical because of the fluidity that modern battlefields 
present at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The nature of recent and most 
likely future conflicts is asymmetrical. Limitations set on physical resources 
necessitate a change in thinking about their effective utilization. While historical 
evidence illustrate that the IA theory has not been used at such a great extent in 
environments of asymmetrical nature, its employment in asymmetric environments 
is possibly the most promising recipe for a successful result due to the IA’s 
compatibility with asymmetrical thinking. 
1.5 Conceptual Approach 
As it has been mentioned above, the two principles of the IA theory are dislocation 
and exploitation. The theories of Chaos, OODA Loop and of Reflexive Control 
were exactly chosen because when they are used in conjunction, they produce the 
maxims of dislocation and exploitation. Early mathematicians had concluded that 
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it was unable to discover a formula that would enable them to explain scientifically 
the system of how the world or even specific mechanisms of the world work. 
Nonetheless, scientists from other fields, such as biology and meteorology, were at 
the same time discovering repetitive patterns in the mechanisms of the dynamical 
systems that they were observing. As a result, mathematicians were later able to 
conclude that despite the fact that the world was chaotic in principle, certain 
patterns were recurring randomly throughout time. In this sense, while it was able 
to predict that certain patterns could materialize again under certain circumstances, 
it still remained unable to predict when these patterns were to occur. Conclusively, 
chaos theory suggested that chaos was after all, decipherable. Subsequently, the 
only limit that was set for an accurate decoding of chaos was the variable of time.  
Unless a time machine was invented, it would remain unable to predict when certain 
events would materialize, even though it was in our knowledge that these events 
would eventually occur. A partial solution to this problem came from the financial 
trading world and it is known as HFT, which stands for High Frequency Trading. 
The main idea behind HFT is to use clever algorithms and super-fast computers to 
detect and exploit market movements. There are two main strategies that HFT 
investors utilize. The utilization of the first strategy pertains that institutional 
investors avoid signaling their intentions to the market by trading large orders of 
stocks and other financial products in small blocks and within specified price 
ranges. By sending out a stream of probing quotes that are swiftly cancelled until 
they elicit a response, high-frequency traders uncover how much an investor is 
willing to pay or sell. Then traders buy the targeted stock ahead of the investor, 
offering it to them a fraction of a second later for a tiny profit. (The Economist, 
2009) 
The second HFT strategy employed is that of collecting rebates that exchanges offer 
to liquidity providers. High-frequency traders will quickly outbid investors before 
immediately selling the shares to the investor at the slightly higher purchase price, 
collecting a rebate of one-quarter of a cent on both trades. High-frequency traders 
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may execute 1,000 trades per second. Computers allow traders to process trades in 
less than 500 microseconds (millionths of a second). (The Economist, 2009) 
For the purposes of this research though, it is not the close resemblance between 
the actual strategies of HFT and the IA theory’s two basic principles, dislocation 
and exploitation that interests us.  This research though concentrates on how high 
frequency traders manipulate time in such a way that they transform the variable of 
time into an ally instead of an opponent. High frequency traders understand two 
things, that they cannot beat time and that they cannot decipher chaos. What they 
understand though is that if they become faster in their decision-making process, 
time will be their ally in the fight against their investors. First, they ambush their 
investors by learning their intentions and secondly, they manipulate investors into 
taking decisions that the traders themselves have already set up as options.  
The schemes of firstly setting a mental ambush for your adversary by utilizing time 
and specifically a faster decision-making process and secondly, offering your 
adversary options that you have already pre-selected and are towards your interest, 
is exactly the principal idea behind the synergy produced by the theories of Chaos, 
OODA Loop and Reflexive Control. 
1.6 Methodological Approach 
Primary research method that will be used for completion of this research project 
will be that of the case study and most specifically, through the use of the 
comparative historical research method. The case studies which will be investigated 
in the scope of this research concern Lawrence’s Arab Revolt and Wingate’s 
expeditions in Sudan, Palestine, Ethiopia and Burma. In these two chapters, through 
the method of comparative historical research and besides the documentation of 
particular events that are linked directly to the three deconstructing theories, this 
research will evaluate how these three theories have synergistically resulted in the 
formulation and application of the IA theory. The reason that these two case studies 
have been included in this research is not because they exhibit the most accurate 
historical evidence of the IA theory being into practice. The actual reason that these 
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case studies were chosen was because of the leading figures, Lawrence of Arabia 
and Orde Wingate. Both characters were inspirers of the IA theory and this is 
depicted clearly in their legacy of writing which clearly illustrates their insightful 
thinking on the subject. More than theorists of the IA, both Lawrence and Wingate 
had the opportunity to practice the method of the IA theory and provide us with a 
multitude of examples of how and when this approach should be utilized. Most 
importantly though, both Lawrence and Wingate had practiced the IA theory, 
instinctively through the combination of Chaos theory, the OODA Loop theory and 
the Reflexive Control theory. 
Additionally, the comparative historical research method, comprised by three 
stages (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003, pp. 11-13) remains the most suitable 
technique for analyzing the case studies and the IA theory. Firstly, comparative 
historical inquiry is fundamentally concerned with explanation and the 
identification of causal configurations that produce major outcomes of interest.  
Secondly, comparative historical researchers explicitly analyze historical 
sequences and take seriously the unfolding of processes over time, which in this 
case is necessary as the three deconstructing theories need to be serially utilized in 
order to produce the desired outcome. Finally, practitioners of comparative 
historical inquiry engage in systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar 
and contrasting cases. Both cases and especially the thinking processes of the two 
leading figures of the cases, offer many similarities which would have been unable 
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-  CHAPTER 2 - 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for 
existing. 
(Albert Einstein to William Miller, 1955, as quoted in LIFE magazine, Vol. 38. p. 
64) 
Although a substantial amount of research has been conducted on the theories of 
the Indirect Approach, Chaos, Reflexive Control and the OODA Loop, no research 
was found of exploring the possibilities of arising synergies between these theories. 
The only exemption though is that in which Greene (2007, par. 8) makes in his 
article called ‘OODA and You’ chaos theory to the OODA loop. Greene argues that 
chaos could be used as a weapon if it is funnelled in the decision-making process 
of the opponent thus paralyzing the opponent’s reactions. It is the ellipsis of 
synthesis between the above-mentioned theories that this research has diagnosed as 
a promising field for research. Nonetheless, as Conant (1964, p. 31) quotes in his 
book ‘Two Modes of Thought’, “Without a combination, science does not 
progress.” It is by combining these three theories that this research will seek to 
accomplish its aims and intentions, set in the previous chapter. 
2.1 The Indirect Approach Theory 
Since Liddell Hart’s original study of the IA theory, in his 1929 book, titled ‘The 
Strategy of Indirect Approach’, many practitioners of war, academics and 
politicians, have invested their time in critically assessing the efficiency of Hart’s 
theory. 
Smith, an experienced practitioner of war, concluded that: “The essence of the 
practise of war is to achieve an asymmetric advantage over one’s opponent.” (2005, 
p. 373) Smith basically argues that if you are unable or unwilling to change your 
own parameters so as to regain the advantage, then you are forced to fight your 
23 
 
adversary on the terms and conditions that he has set. (2005, p. 373) Smith’s 
reference to the maxim of dislocation, depicts a thorough understanding of the 
importance of setting your opponent in a controlled environment. Ueshiba, the 
Japanese creator of the martial art of Aikido also noted the importance of this 
concept by stating that: “Even the most powerful human being has a limited sphere 
of strength. Draw him outside of that sphere and into your own, and his strength 
will dissipate.” (1992, p. 101) Both Smith and Ueshiba converge with Hart’s fifth 
and sixth axioms of the IA theory, which state that you must “take a line of 
operation which offers alternative objectives” and always ensure “that both plan 
and dispositions are flexible-adaptable to circumstances.” (1929, ch. 12, pp. 179-
180) 
Another observer of Hart’s IA theory, Atkinson besides exploring the diachronic 
value of Hart’s two main concepts, continues in exploring the technological aspects 
of warfare and the psycho-political effects of a conflict. (1965, pp. 161-163) He 
also acknowledges that the importance of Hart’s literary works, lies behind the 
enduring value of Hart’s works, as they seem to pervade most of the issues of 
warfare that trouble us today. (Atkinson, 1965, p. 163) In order to attain a deeper 
understanding of the significance of Hart’s IA theory, we must comprehend how 
Hart came to the inception of the IA theory. Larson (1980, p. 70) offers a clear 
description of how Hart came to be an apostle of the concept of limited war. The 
phenomenon of absolute war had emerged and established itself as the primary 
method of conducting warfare in Europe, through the submission of military 
thinkers and practitioners of war to Clausewitz’s book ‘On War’, and the maxims 
that it professed. Clausewitz had accepted that battlefield success was the sole 
objective of war which in return resulted to European military thinking transitioning 
to the kind of attrition’s war. (Larson, 1980, p. 70) 
However, the conduct of both World Wars had assisted Hart in realizing that the 
concept of absolute war, portrayed a false relationship between the objectives of 
war and the objectives of policy. Instead of war being a continuation of politics, the 
concept of absolute war had reversed this relationship into politics being driven by 
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the phenomenon of war. This is also depicted in the first and second axioms of 
Hart’s IA theory which state that you must firstly, keep your object always in mind 
and secondly, ensure the adjustment of your end to your means. (1929, ch. 12, pp. 
179) Since the objective of war was then to change the enemy’s will at the lowest 
cost, Hart concluded that seeking decision in battle, where the enemy’s resistance 
was of the greatest magnitude, was deficient. (Larson, 1980, p. 71) Following this 
line of thought, Hart concluded that an attack to dislocate the thinking and 
psychological systems of the enemy, would have been much more efficient, both 
in terms of cost and time. Hart’s conclusion was also close to Fuller’s earlier 
analogy of the brain controlling the body, which called for attacks on enemy’s 
communications and command centres. (Freedman, 2013, p. 134) Furthermore, 
Freedman stated that Hart’s IA theory was guided by Sun Tzu’s military thinking, 
and especially with the latter’s statement of: “The perfection of strategy would be, 
therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting.” (Freedman, 2013, p. 
137) Axioms three and four, stating that you must choose the line of least 
expectation and exploit the line of least expectation also complied to Sun Tzu’s 
main concepts. (Hart, 1929, ch. 12, pp. 179) 
Because of Hart’s failure to approach the IA theory primarily from a scientific 
perspective, this lead to the creation of confusion, especially among his critics. For 
example, Freedman (2013, p. 138) remarks that as they were always elements of 
subtlety, surprise, or innovation in military victories during the course of history, 
the concept of indirectness could be either strategic, tactical, psychological or even 
sometimes unconscious. On the other hand, the majority of polemics of Hart’s IA 
theory have produced responses that transcend the original framework of the debate 
set by Hart. Such an example is Barnett’s (1999, pp. 62-63) argument that Hart 
approached war as a bloodless game of skill, rather than what war really was. 
Furthermore, Barnett argued that in both literary works of Hart, concerning the 
World Wars, there is no depiction of understanding any of the technological and 
industrial basis that is required for a war to be preserved, while at the same time he 
concurs with Fuller’s description of the IA strategy as the strategy of evasion. 
(Barnett, 1999, p.62) Another point that was made in support of the IA’s invalidity 
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was that Liddell Hart’s IA theory was too vague, also described as a theory of 
everything. Hart himself was accused of not being one of those “empiricists that 
search more diligently, and with the greatest effort, in exactly those places where it 
seems most likely that we can prove our theories wrong.” (Barnett, 1999, p.62) That 
is why Hart was indicted of falling into the an intellectually recursive trap of his 
own making.  
 
While Barnett’s criticism is correct, he seems to have failed in acknowledging the 
bigger picture behind Hart’s ingenuity. Hart did not focus on the logistical, 
technological and industrial issues that a war required because he considered these, 
granted, as the technological prowess that the world had experienced in the past 
century was a constant variable in the greater equation of conducting warfare. 
While Hart perceived himself as a military strategist and thinker, Barnett is 
misguided probably by his own predispositions on material versus immaterial 
variables, thus positioning himself against Hart’s fertile thinking of new strategies 
that can help economize and revolutionize the conduct of war. Thus, from a critical 
perspective, Barnett is left estranged in contemplating issues of secondary value to 
the conduct of warfare. This point is stressed by Freedman which divides the 
application of the IA’s theory two maxims in the physical and the psychological 
spheres. In the physical sphere, avoiding battle required upsetting the enemy’s 
dispositions by means of a sudden change of front such as separating enemy forces, 
endangering supplies, menacing routes of retreat, or combining several of these 
moves. On the other hand, in the psychological sphere, dislocation instructed that 
these physical effects be impressed on the commander’s mind, creating an 
illusionary sense of entrapment. (Freedman, 2013, p. 137) 
 
Another important point is the fact that the advocates of Hart’s IA theory criticise 
the practicality and the efficacy of Hart’s theory on the battlefield. Whereas on the 
other hand, Hart’s critics focus more on the theoretical realm of his theory and also 
on the process by which Hart came to producing the IA theory. Despite the 
accusations of Hart’s theory being inapplicable, Lawrence commented on Hart and 
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his knowledge that: “He lives for the avoidance of battle and murder, and for 
winning campaigns by wise dispositions. Yet he is not a philosopher: all his 
knowledge applies itself.” (1933, p. 907) As for the practical application of Hart’s 
knowledge, the most successful military commanders of the state of Israel would 
undeniably support Lawrence’s assertion. (Bond, 1976, pp. 83-89) 
 
2.2 The Indirect Approach and the connection with Chaos theory 
 “…the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation.” 
(Thucydides, 431 B.C., The Peloponnesian War, Book I, 1.84-[3]) 
 
Greek historian Polybius commented on the importance of unpredictability in 
ancient battlefields, assigning it to nature which simply ". . . makes a single trivial 
error sufficient to cause failure in a design, but correctness in every detail barely 
enough for success." (Culham, 1989, p. 192) Clausewitz also (1832, pp. 65-69) 
denoted a small chapter on the friction of war, commenting that the accumulation 
of difficulties in the conduct of warfare, produce a kind of friction that is 
inconceivable unless somebody experiences war first-hand. While being one of the 
most easily identified attributes of warfare, under the namely disguises of chance, 
fortune, luck, or τύχη, chaos emerged both as a theory and a branch of mathematics 
late in the 1880s, initiating an extensive research principally on the behaviour of 
dynamical systems.  
Mann (1992, p. 58) summarizes that research in chaos theory has shown that within 
these dynamical systems, nonperiodic order exists, which means that seemingly 
random collections of data can yield orderly yet nonrecurrent patterns. Another 
important point is that such chaotic systems exhibit sensitive dependence upon 
initial conditions, suggesting that a slight change in any one of the initial inputs 
leads to disproportionate divergent outcomes. (Mann, 1992, p. 58) Finally, the fact 
that order exists in these systems, suggests that patterns can be predicted in chaotic 
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systems. (Mann, 1992, p. 58) In terms of exploiting chaos as a weapon though, no 
literature has been found that even acknowledges this possibility.  
Supporting expressions on the possibility of weaponizing chaos are not to be found 
in the academic field. This is because chaos has not been deciphered in such an 
extent. No further leap regarding the exploitation of chaos as a weapon can be 
made, unless chaos theory is mathematically proven that it can be utilized 
effectively under certain circumstances, for the successful conduct of warfare. 
Nonetheless, perhaps as a giant theoretical leap was needed in the field of quantum 
mechanics in order for the relativity theory to emerge, thus allowing us to 
comprehend in depth nuclear physics and then produce the first nuclear weapons, 
the same evolutionary process in the theoretical realm might be required in order to 
elucidate the usefulness and applicability of chaos theory in the conduct of warfare. 
According to scholars Paret and Howard (1965, pp. 6-8), Clausewitz’s predecessors 
treated chaos in a negative manner whereas the development of the positive side of 
chance, was one of the special contributions of Clausewitz in the progress of 
military theory. 
 
While Korybko (2015, p. 24) concurs with the position of Mann’s (1992) article 
“Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought”, he further points out that “the incorporation 
of chaotic principles into Hybrid Wars is a defining aspect of Fourth Generation 
Warfare.” Furthermore, Korybko states that “Hybrid War is at its core, managed 
chaos.” (2015, p. 24) Mann’s (1992, p. 60) most significant contribution in the use 
of chaos in the conduct of warfare, is the remark that he makes on the true value of 
chaos theory, which in his own words: “Large interactive systems perpetually 
organize themselves to a critical state in which a minor event starts a chain reaction 
that can lead to a catastrophe. . . Although composite systems produce more minor 
events than catastrophes, chain reactions of all sizes are an integral part of the 
dynamics. . . Furthermore, composite systems never reach equilibrium but instead 
evolve from one metastable state to the next.” (Per Bak and Kam Chen, 1991, p. 
46) Although that the importance of the metastable state will be discussed in chapter 
six, as it regards the second hypothesis of this research project, the concept of the 
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metastable state is mentioned at this point of the research. This is because it is easier 
for the reader to know beforehand some elements of chaos theory, in order for him 
to comprehend better how chaos theory helps reinterpret and apply the IA theory.  
 
Sergei’s (2011) article substantiates the applicability of ‘manageable chaos theory’ 
else which was also proposed by Gene Sharp, who wrote ‘From Dictatorship to 
Democracy’, and Steven Mann’s (1992) ‘Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought’. 
All the above, depict that the weaponization of chaos has not only materialized from 
the theoretical realm into the practical, but it has also proven its efficiency, 
especially in the conduct of fourth generation warfare1.  
The most important lesson that can be drawn from the above lines suggests that war 
is a phenomenon which abides by the laws of chaos. As such, repetition of certain 
patterns can be discerned in the phenomenon of war, with the only exemption being 
the fact that these patterns are aperiodic, meaning that they come up at non-steady 
time intervals. As a result, the only problem that remains, is the prediction of when 
these patterns will emerge. The answer to this question came from John Boyd. 
 
2.3 The Indirect Approach and the connection with OODA Loop theory  
United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd, was an eccentric figure. Pushing aside 
his flying career, Boyd invested a huge amount of his time in reading voraciously 
on subjects of military history, engineering, quantum mechanics and philosophy. 
                                                          
1  “Fourth generation operations are defined in this study as conflict which combines 
elements of guerrilla tactics, terrorism, traditional warfare, and the ability to exploit and 
skip generations of technology to conduct operations, particularly to target the will and 
morale of the enemy’s support structure, in order to achieve political victory. In this 
definition, the support structure refers to both the population and the combatants. This 
definition does not focus on nation-states, thus including cases where transnational 
groups are the instigator or target of the conflict. Additionally, the specific methods 
applied in the conflict are not specified; therefore, fourth generation operations may use 
any military, diplomatic, economic, or informational instrument of power to influence 




By the end of his cerebral voyage, he had come up with the theory of the OODA 
Loop. Boyd himself considered the OODA Loop as the ultimate formula, by which 
if exploited in the correct way, victory would be rendered on the side of the 
OODA’s user. Boyd’s inception of the OODA Loop which accounts for the 
repetition of four independent and interconnected phases, Observe, Orient, Decide, 
Attack, rested upon other three concepts, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem2, 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle3 and the Second Law of Thermodynamics4. 
 
OODA loop describes four sequential phases. Observe-Orient-Decide-Attack. 
(Coram, 2002, p. 344) In the phase of Observation, the user gathers as much raw 
information as it is available, by using a variety of sensory systems. The quantity 
of gathered raw information is not of much importance though as it is the quality 
of information that plays a more significant role. In the Orient phase, the user 
processes the information and focuses on what he considers the most important and 
valuable information. For the Decide phase, the user decides on what actions should 
be undertaken, always taking into consideration the quality of information that he 
                                                          
2  “The first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent formal system F within 
which a certain amount of arithmetic can be carried out, there are statements of the 
language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F. According to the second 
incompleteness theorem, such a formal system cannot prove that the system itself is 
consistent (assuming it is indeed consistent).” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2013) 
 
3  “The uncertainty principle states that one cannot assign exact simultaneous values to 
the position and momentum of a physical system. Rather, these quantities can only be 
determined with some characteristic “uncertainties” that cannot become arbitrarily small 
simultaneously.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016) 
 
4  “There exists a useful thermodynamic variable called entropy. A natural process that 
starts in one equilibrium state and ends in another will go in the direction that cause the 
entropy of the system plus the environment to increase for an irreversible process and to 




possesses. The final phase, that of Attack is the more practical aspect in which 
decisions that were made in the previous phase are implemented as fast as possible. 
OODA loop’s value is usually disregarded as oversimplified but its value is 
understood when some of its attributes are taken into consideration. The loop’s four 
phases do not work only in conjunction with each other but they are individual 
components of a dynamic system. This means that each phase of the OODA loop 
consists of another never-ending loop. In essence, when the cycle of each phase is 
completed, the process starts again. Additionally, when the OODA loop is 
completed, the cycle will start again from the beginning. The speed in which the 
OODA loop is applied is the most significant element of the OODA loop. As Boyd 
himself also remarks for the OODA loop “In order to win, we should operate at a 
faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries-or, better yet, get inside the adversary's 
Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop...Such activity will 
make us appear ambiguous and unpredictable, thereby generate confusion and 
disorder among our adversaries since our adversaries will be unable to generate 
mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient 
rhythm or patterns they are competing against.” (Coram, 2002, p. 328) 
 
The principal reason that the OODA loop theory has been inserted in this research 
project is because it allows its user to take unpredictability out of chaos and also 
weaponize chaos. It was mentioned above that chaos is organized in aperiodic 
patterns. With the utilization of OODA loop though, these patterns can be 
discerned. Let us assume that for the purposes of this research, two teams, blue and 
red, are tasked with simulating the decision-making processes of two adversarial 
parties in a war scenario. Both teams are equally emerged in chaos, as it is unknown 
to both of them what the other’s team strategy is. Both teams have been taught the 
basics of the OODA loop theory and they decide to put their knowledge into action. 
Team blue though, goes through the OODA loop at a faster pace than team red. As 
a result, team blue becomes the initiator in the battle events, sowing confusion 
towards team red. What was before an opponent, chaos, has now evolved into an 
ally. Team red’s perception is that they are obliged to follow and react to team’s 
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blue actions. Team red have entrapped themselves with chaos and their own pre-
conceptions. On the other hand, team blue is oriented forwardly and invests heavily 
on sustaining a high level of situational awareness of the strengths and weaknesses 
of both team blue and red. He who gains the initiative in the battlefield, is already 
a step ahead of his opponent. The next step is for him to insert himself in his 
opponent’s mind and control it by fixing the stage accordingly. 
 
2.4 The Indirect Approach and the connection with Reflexive Control 
Theory 
The best way to predict the future is to invent it.  
(Alan Kay-Xerox. 1982. InfoWorld.) 
 
Sun Tzu was the first to acknowledge the fact that “The supreme art of war is to 
subdue the enemy without fighting.” (ch. 3, p. 29) Almost two decades ago, Colonel 
S. Leonenko defined Reflexive Control theory as “transmitting motives and 
grounds from the controlling entity to the controlled system that stimulate the 
desired decision. The goal of RC theory is to prompt the enemy to make a decision 
unfavorable to himself. Naturally, one must have an idea about how he thinks.” 
(Leonenko, 1995, p. 28) Thomas (2015, p. 456) refers and explains Reflexive 
Control theory as: “A truly unique Russian concept that has assisted Russian actions 
over the past decades. It was developed and used during the Soviet era. It is defined 
in several ways, depending on the author. RC theory has generally been understood 
as a means of conveying specially prepared information to a partner or an opponent 
to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the 
initiator of the action.” (Thomas, 2015, pp. 445-461) Makhnin’s (2013, pp. 31-46) 
article, ‘Reflexive Processes in Military Art: The Historico-Gnoseological Aspect’ 





Whereas RC theory is categorized as an aspect of Russian information-
psychological operations (Thomas, 2015, p. 16-21), RC theory has recently 
emerged in the literature that concerns the Hybrid Warfare concepts that were 
practiced by the Russian Federation in the events of Ukraine, which started in 2014. 
(Perry, 2015) Despite the different literary labels that practitioners of war come to 
identify RC theory, the diachronic interest that the theory received from both the 
Russians and the Americans, depicts that both parties acknowledge the importance 
of the concept. (Thomas, 2004, pp. 237–256) (Diane, 1986) The insertion of this 
particular theory in this research project has been deemed critical, as RC theory is 
the cornerstone of the IA theory. It is worth mentioning that a close relationship 
exists between the RC theory and the OODA loop theory as Boyd notices on T.E. 
Lawrence’s observation of how a commander must ‘arrange the mind’ of the enemy 
in order to secure victory. (Blount, 2009, p. 193) 
 
One of the most important points of the RC theory, is the fact that it stresses directly 
the growing significance of the use of social science techniques in the science of 
warfare. In fact, the use of social science techniques confirms one of the elementary 
truisms of war, as Robinson (2004, p. 16) quotes: “the battlefield is a human one 
and creating psychological impact is the key to victory.” Jean Piaget’s theory of 
Cognitive Development and extensive research in the field of psychology about 
perceptions, has shown that one’s own beliefs and judgemental capabilities, are 
literally unique. This is because each person leads a unique path in life, both in 
terms of genetics and experiences, that is non-identical with that of any other human 
being at any point of time and space. Heuer (1999, pp. 1-6) quite starkly stresses 
out this point in his book ‘Psychology of Intelligence Analysis’, that “people have 
no conscious experience of most of what happens in the human mind”, leading them 
in believing that “what appears spontaneously in consciousness to be the result of 





It is nothing less than a common secret that any effective formula that is to be 
utilized in the field of war, must contain the pivotal key of adaptation. Louisiana 
State University business professor named Leon C. Megginson (1963, Speech at 
the convention of the Southwestern Social Science Association) stated that 
“According to Darwin’s Origin of Species, it is not the most intellectual of the 
species that survives; it is not the strongest that survives; but the species that 
survives is the one that is able best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment 
in which it finds itself.” The first stage of understanding the necessity for change, 
in order to ensure survival, is performed in the intellectual level.  
Smith came to the same conclusion as Megginson, regarding the success of 
conducting warfare. This is clearly depicted in his words: “On every occasion that 
I have been sent to achieve some military objective in order to serve a political 
purpose, I, and those with me, have had to change our method and reorganize in 
order to succeed. Until this was done we could not use our force effectively. On the 
basis of my lengthy experience, I have come to consider this as normal – necessary 
part of every operation. And after forty years of service, and particularly the last 
twelve, I believe I have gained an understanding of how to think about this 
inevitable and crucial phenomenon of conflict and warfare. The need to adapt is 
driven by the decisions of the opponent, the choice of objectives, the way or method 
force is applied, and the forces and resources available, particularly when operating 
with allies. Only when adaptation and context are complete can force be applied 
with utility.” (Smith, 2005, p. 10) 
2.5 The application of the three theories in the chosen case studies 
It has been argued in the introductory chapter of this research that the three theories, 
Chaos, OODA Loop and Reflexive Control theory will assist this project in 
dissolving the IA theory through a scientific way. In the process of researching, it 
was very difficult in finding case studies that followed the eight axioms that Hart 
proposed as the pillars upon which the IA rests. As a result of this, it was decided 
that a different approach would be required in order to deconstruct the IA theory. 
Hence, it was decided that case studies that included the two principles of the IA 
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theory, dislocation and exploitation, would be chosen. To further accentuate the 
credibility of the scientific approach, it was decided also that the two maxims of 
the IA theory needed to be explained through the use of the previously mentioned 
theories. The IA theory has been practiced in both case studies. How then, these 
theories will be utilized and how will they be applied in the following case studies?  
Firstly, the existence of these theories will be noted in both case studies. Secondly, 
it will be shown how both Lawrence and Wingate utilized the theories in such a 
unique way, even at times at an unconscious level, so that they managed to outwit 
their opponents. Emphasis will be given on the thinking of both Lawrence and 
Wingate, as it is through their thinking that we have the opportunity to comprehend 
how they came to the conclusion that the best way to conduct warfare was through 
the application of the IA theory. During the case studies and their analysis, the 
reader will notice that some of the actions or thoughts of the Lawrence and Wingate, 
fall out of the orthodox way of conducting war, especially during the time periods 
in which these two characters lived. Many considered Lawrence and Wingate’s 
figures eccentric, heretical, sometimes even mentally perplexed. Nonetheless, 
criticized by the results of their actions, they had both managed to prove that 
unorthodoxy was a road paved only for the bold and the intellectual. 
Previous to entering chapters three and four, an explanation of why these specific 
case studies were chosen needs to be offered. As the reader will observe, both 
chapters offer some similarities. Firstly, each case study has one leading figure that 
plays an instrumental role. It is as if the actions of each leading figure are guided 
instinctively by the IA theory. This is the reason why the beginning of each chapter 
is devoted in the description of the leading figures of the case studies. The sole 
purpose of these short descriptions is to offer to the reader an insight to the minds 
of both Lawrence of Arabia and Orde Wingate. Secondly, despite the chronologic 
proximity of both case studies, the Arab Revolt and Wingate’s exploits are confined 
in the periods from the start of WWI to the end of WWII. The unparalleled 
productivity and creativity that countries exhibited in this period in military affairs 
was due to the fact that during WWI and WWII, victory equalled survival. Both 
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- CHAPTER 3 - 
         CASE STUDY – T.E LAWRENCE AND THE ARAB 
REVOLT 
 
3.1 Lawrence’s education and the outbreak of the Great War 
Thomas Edward Lawrence was born in 1888, in Wales. His initial interest in the 
Middle East was in the castles of the Crusaders, especially those in Ottoman Syria, 
which in the summer of 1909 he set out alone on a three month, 1000 miles walking 
tour to explore.  (Wilson, 1989, pp. 57–61) After his solo research pilgrimage to 
the Middle East on which he based his thesis, titled ‘The influence of the Crusades 
on European Military Architecture—to the end of the 12th century’, T.E Lawrence 
obtained in 1910 a First-Class degree in History from Oxford University. Calder 
(1996, Introduction of ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’, p. 12) notes that Lawrence had 
also developed a unique skillset, as a leader of Middle Eastern people while 
organizing under other academic seniors, scores of laborers on the dig.  
By the time Lawrence had completed some brief work in Egypt and the Sinai, the 
Great War erupted. His previous field experience as an archaeologist, which at the 
time being, the specific profession was regularly used as a cover for intelligence 
operators, led to Lawrence being commissioned as an officer in Intelligence 
attached to the British GHQ in Cairo, center of planning for the Eastern war against 
the Turkish Empire, which had allied itself with Germany. Calder remarks on 
Lawrence that: “Whatever else may be controversial about Lawrence, there is no 
doubt that he had an acute mind and a great deal of practical ability, both 
organizational and, as it would prove, technical. He was clever at gathering 
‘intelligence’, understood men of all nationalities quickly, and had an equally swift 
insight into the machines which made modern warfare very different from the 
combats of the Crusaders.” (Calder, 1996, Introduction of ‘Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom’, p. 12) Lawrence’s organizational and intellectual skills were shadowed 
by his gift of empathy. Lawrence’s ability to understand the inner mechanisms of 
the human soul, allowed him to build lasting relationships with Arab parties and 
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between previously hostile Arab parties which were of extreme use in the Arab 
Revolt campaign. 
3.2 Roots of the Arab Rebellion 
The general impression that concerns the birth of the Arab Revolt is that in 
exchange of Arabs allying to the British struggle against the Central Powers, Arabs 
were to be granted a state after the end of the war. This impression is also sustained 
throughout Lawrence’s book, ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’. This was not the case 
though. In the beginning of the 20th century, Turkey was undergoing a phase of 
cultural zymosis, as a result of the growing public dissatisfaction between the 
Turkish population and the Turkish administration. This cultural zymosis came as 
a result of the treatment that the Ottoman Empire used on the conquered territories 
and their populations, during the Empire’s early expansion phases. At the 
Ottoman’s empire apogee, the Ottoman administration had found it easier to 
employ the technique of divide and conquer between the multi-ethic populations 
that comprised it. While in the long-term, this approach served the Ottoman 
administration very well, it also had its disadvantages, one of them being the fact 
that the Ottoman empire was not an empire of homogeneous population but was 
still by 1914, an empire comprised by ethnic entities which were united and ruled, 
under the Sultan.  
Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, had dreamt of a regular Arab Empire, to be ruled 
over by himself from Mecca. At the time of Turkey’s zymosis, Hussein had taken 
the opportunity of a forced, but nevertheless honorable confinement in 
Constantinople in order to secure a first-class education for his four sons. Hussein 
had sought British support for his personal ambitions well before the outbreak of 
war, and his decision to collaborate with this Christian Power against Turkey’s 
Sultan was exclusively motivated by his personal gain considerations. (Efraim 
Karsh and Inari Karsh, 1997, p. 267) After the failure of the Gallipoli campaign, 
Hussein was hesitant in asking for support from the British but his ambitions 
overcame his hesitation at a secret meeting he had with some British officers on a 
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deserted reef on the Red Sea coast near Mecca.  Hussein was promised that England 
would give him what help he needed in guns and stores for his war. 
 As a result of this promise, Hussein gave orders to attack the Turkish garrison at 
Medina and this is how the Arab Revolt had begun. (Egan, 1948, pp. 396-397) 
Lawrence (1935, p. 38) himself noted also that “the subject races of the Empire, 
who formed nearly seven-tenths of its total population, grew daily in strength and 
knowledge; for their lack of tradition and responsibility, as well as their lighter and 
quicker minds, disposed them to accept new ideas.”  British support of the Arab 
Revolt cause was also not as warm as was once believed to be despite British 
nervousness to secure the Suez Canal, one of the main arteries of communication 
with the British colonies to the East. Another crucial factor were also the raw 
materials that the Middle East was providing to the war effort such as corn, rice and 
oil deposits. (Lawrence, 1935, p. 7). Papers of the Arab Bureau, a department which 
had been recently formed, under the direct control of the Foreign Office, to assist 
the revolt (Egan, 1948, pp. 398), reveal that Brigadier General G.F Clayton favored 
British support of Hussein and the Revolt but only in so far as to allow the Revolt 
to sink or swim on its own strength. (Tarver, 1978, p. 592) 
3.3 In quest of an Arab leader 
In search of a “power or race which could outweigh the Turks in numbers, in output, 
and in mental activity” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 39) Lawrence was set upon finding a 
man which would unite Arabs in their Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. 
Lawrence approval of Prince Faisal as the most qualified for leading the Arab 
Revolt is condensed in his description of prince Feisal for whom he states that: “His 
personal charm, his imprudence, the pathetic hint of frailty as the sole reserve of 
this proud character made him the idol of his followers. His training in Abdul 
Hamid’s entourage had made him past-master in diplomacy. His military service 
with the Turks had given him a working knowledge of tactics. Meanwhile, here, as 
it seemed, was offered to our hand, which had only to be big enough to take it, a 
prophet who, if veiled, would give cogent form to the idea behind the activity of 
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the Arab Revolt. It was all and more than we had hoped for, much more than our 
halting course deserved.” (Lawrence, 1935, pp. 82-83) 
3.4 Attesting to the eight axioms of the Indirect Approach theory 
Following the failed Gallipoli campaign at the straits of Dardanelles, the Allies 
became pressed in finding another way of defeating Turkey. As a result, the Allies 
followed unconsciously, every single one of Hart’s IA theory axioms. Firstly, they 
kept their objective in mind which was to defeat Turkey and secondly, they 
managed to adjust their means in order to achieve their objective by seizing the 
opportunity of an Arab Revolt, offered by one of the Sultan’s trusted associates, 
Hussein. By taking this option, the Allies attested devoutly to axioms four to eight. 
Allies had managed to choose and exploit the line of least expectation as the Sultan 
would find out later, that he was threatened more by the actions of his corrupted 
associates than from his stated enemies. At their second attempt, Allies were 
uneager in renewing an attack along the same line after it has once failed and for 
that reason they did not throw their weight into a stroke whilst their opponent was 
on guard. In the case where the Arab Revolt failed to achieve its mission, Allies 
were eager to distance themselves from the diplomatic repercussions that states 
such as England would most likely face, after providing their support to an Arab 
guerrilla force which fought against a sovereign state such as the Ottoman Empire. 
This was clearly apparent in Brigadier General G.F Clayton’s favoring the British 
support of Hussein and the Revolt but only in so far as to allow the Revolt to sink 
or swim on its own strength. (Tarver, 1978, p. 592) As a result, in either case of the 
Revolt being successful or not, the Allies responses were flexible and adjustable to 
the circumstances. 
3.5 Lawrence’s Approach to War 
Lawrence’s lack of military education was balanced by his early interest and 
reading on military history, completed during his studies as an archaeologist. 
Lawrence confided to Lowell Thomas that his study of the mobile tactics of Caesar 
and Xenophon had been of more value to him in his desert campaign than Foch's 
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more rigid ‘Principles of War’. (Thomas L., 1924, p. 14) His lack of a military 
training though allowed him to perceive situations through a wider perspective. 
This concept was completely opposite than the army’s insistence to an injection of 
a strict rigidity in the thinking processes of its personnel in order to endure 
discipline and cohesion. Lawrence’s lack of military training, was in that respect 
an advantage, that allowed him to be far more creative in coming up with options 
on how to achieve the objectives, set by his superiors.  
Lawrence’s approach in achieving a successful outcome for the Revolt was 
primarily unorthodox, considering all the other traditional ways that military 
leaders often utilized at the time being. Instead of focusing on gathering a large 
Arab army, training it and then seeking a decisive battle with the Turkish army, 
Lawrence chose to set his own terms by which he would force his opponent to fight 
him. He concluded that his “largest resources, the Bedouin on whom our war must 
be built, were unused to formal operations, but had assets of mobility, toughness, 
self-assurance, knowledge of the country, intelligent courage” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 
215) and for this reason he needed to exploit the dispersal of his troops instead of 
massing them against the enemy. Lawrence conclusions were abiding by the first 
four axioms that Hart proposed later as the axioms of the IA theory. He had adjusted 
his means to his end while he parallelly chose and exploited the lines of least 
expectation. The Turks knew that they were facing a small Arab force, but the 
majority of them never had the chance, during the war to fire upon the Arab force. 
(Lawrence, 1935, p. 184) 
Trying to discern the aim of war, Lawrence was unconvinced that “victory could 
be purchased only by blood.” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 178) If the destruction of the 
enemy’s armed forces by the one process, battle was the true aim of war, then how 
a Turkish Clausewitz would buy his victory as the Arabs had no organized forces? 
(Lawrence, 1935, p. 178) He concluded that Von de Goltz had seemed to go deeper, 
saying it was necessary not to annihilate the enemy, but to break his courage.” 
(Lawrence, 1935, p. 178) At this point, he also stressed Saxe’s point of “reaching 
victory without battle, but by pressing our advantages mathematical and 
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psychological.” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 215) The idea of avoiding battle, lies at the 
heart of the IA theory. Lawrence was on a path of discovering and applying the two 
principles and the eight axioms of the IA theory. 
3.6 Lawrence and Chaos theory 
As it has been noted in the introductory chapter, this research has identified three 
theories that will be utilized in order to successfully deconstruct the IA application. 
Lawrence acknowledges the existence and the importance of chaos as a factor in 
his calculations for conducting warfare, quoting that “Victory in general habit 
leaned to the clear-sighted, though fortune and superior intelligence could make a 
sad muddle of nature’s ‘inexorable’ law.” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 180) What he calls 
nature’s inexorable law, is clearly chance, a comprising element of chaos. 
Lawrence second observation on the nature of chaos though is startling. He 
mentions that “a line of variability, Man, persisted like leaven through its estimates, 
making them irregular.” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 181) His observation on chaos, is 
almost identical with the one that mathematicians would years later identify as the 
most significant characteristic of a dynamical system, that patterns can be discerned 
through chaos in aperiodic cycles.  
3.7 Lawrence and OODA Loop theory 
What was needed then for Lawrence in order to deconstruct chaos, was to come up 
with a practical way that would allow him to discern these aperiodic patterns 
through the chaos that was produced in the process of conducting warfare. At the 
time when Lawrence was organizing or even sometimes personally even lead some 
of the attacks, the OODA Loop theory had not been invented. On the other hand, 
Lawrence states that “discrimination of what point of the enemy organism to 
disarrange would come to us with war practice. Our tactics should be tip and run: 
not pushes, but strokes. We should never try to improve an advantage. We should 
use the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place.” (Lawrence, 1935, 
p. 328) At the core of the OODA Loop theory lies the use of time and the element 
of adaptability. The element of adaptability was a crucial variable in the British way 
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of conducting war and especially counterinsurgency operations, as some years 
earlier Callwell had stated in a lecture at the Aldershot Military Society in 1895, 
that in order for an army to secure victory, it was deemed necessary to “adapt our 
principles to the nature of the enemy”. (Whittingham, 2012, p. 594) 
 
It is precisely these elements that Lawrence also stresses. The OODA Loop theory 
basically states that there are four independent phases, Observe, Orient, Decide and 
Attack. The user of this theory goes through each phase in order to obtain situational 
awareness of an event. The user that goes through the OODA Loop at a faster 
rhythm than the other users, is clearly at an advantage because he obtains not only 
a clearer situational awareness but also because he obtains it before the other users. 
As a result, he can be the initiator of actions, whereas the other users are 
transformed into passive observers of evolving events. That is the meaning behind 
Lawrence’s words of using the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest 
place. 
 
Lawrence distilment of a higher form of warfare comes in Book III, chapter XXXIII 
of his book ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom.’ He deconstructs war in three independent 
components. These are the Algebraical element, the Biological element and the 
Psychological element. In his own words, “The first confusion was the false 
antithesis between strategy, the aim in war, the synoptic regard seeing each part 
relative to the whole, and tactics, the means towards a strategic end, the particular 
steps of its staircase. They seemed only points of view from which to ponder the 
elements of war, the Algebraical element of things, a Biological element of lives, 
and the Psychological element of ideas. The Algebraical element looked to me a 
pure science, subject to a mathematical law, inhuman. It was essentially 






3.8 Lawrence and Reflexive Control theory 
Lawrence’s epiphany though was not of acknowledging chaos or the way of 
interpreting it for his own benefit. But it was through his comprehensive 
understanding of these two concepts that he realized that the true art of war was in 
placing your opponent in a controlled environment. Lawrence credited Xenophon’s 
term of ‘diathetics’ as the inspiration for his inception of the concept of arranging 
the mind of your enemy. Following is the original account of the conclusion of 
Lawrence on the arrangement of the mind of the enemy. “Some of it concerned the 
crowd, an adjustment of its spirit to the point where it became useful to exploit in 
action, and the pre-direction of this changing spirit to a certain end. Some of it 
concerned the individual, and then it became a rare art of human kindness, 
transcending, by purposed emotion, the gradual logical sequence of the mind. It 
was more subtle than tactics, and better worth doing, because it dealt with 
uncontrollable, with subjects incapable of direct command. It considered the 
capacity for mood of our men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation 
of whatever in them promised to profit our intention. We had to arrange their minds 
in order of battle just as carefully and as formally as other officers would arrange 
their bodies. And not only our own men’s minds, though naturally they came first. 
We must also arrange the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; then 
those other minds of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, since more than 
half the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting 
the verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle.” (Lawrence, 1935, 
pp. 184-185)   
The most important aspect of Lawrence’s inception is the fact that he has 
discovered a solution that in his own opinion, allowed him to dealt with the 
uncontrollability of events. Note that he did not mention that his inception 
eliminated unpredictability, but it offered him a way of organizing unpredictability 
so as to obtain his objectives. Lawrence also shows a clear understanding for the 
connection between human psychology and human logical reasoning. He places 
special emphasis on the manipulation of human logical reasoning through the 
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human psychological factor as the catalytic factor for gaining victory in the conduct 
of war. He defined the ability of arranging the hearts and minds of his own people 
but also those of his enemies as the ultimate skill that a general could obtain. On 
describing this phenomenon, he borrowed from Plato the term of δόξα. On this his 
commented that: “The ‘felt’ element in troops, not expressible in figures, had to be 
guessed at by the equivalent of Plato’s δόξα and the greatest commander of men 
was he whose intuitions most nearly happened. Nine-tenths of tactics were certain 
enough to be teachable in schools; but the irrational tenth was like the kingfisher 
flashing across the pool, and in it lay the test of generals. It could be ensued only 
by instinct (sharpened by thought practicing the stroke) until at the crisis it came 
naturally, a reflex. There had been men whose δόξα so nearly approached 
perfection that by its road they reached the certainty of ἐπιστήμη. The Greeks might 
have called such genius for command νόησις had they bothered to rationalize 
revolt.” (Lawrence, 1935, pp. 182-183) 
3.9 Callwell’s influence on Lawrence 
Most likely though, Lawrence was influenced by Callwell’s ‘moral force of 
civilization’ by the time he had come to the conclusion that the moral effect was 
very important in the conduct of warfare. Callwell coined the term ‘butcher and 
bolt’ in order to describe describe the punitive raids in which regular forces would 
burn villages and remove crops and cattle. This strategy was considered by Callwell 
as the best way to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the enemy. (Whittingham, 2012, 
p. 592) The importance of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people had been 
indeed much more-earlier identified than both Lawrence and Callwell but both of 
them had chosen different methods of attaining their objectives. Callwell had 
chosen to achieve his objectives by violence and suppression whereas Lawrence 
chose to weaponize chaos, fix his opponent’s mind and then fight him at the terms 
that he had already set. Another difference between Lawrence and Callwell’s 
thinking was that Callwell believed that irregular warfare should be kept as 
‘regular’ as possible. This is inferred in his statement that: ‘The whole spirit of the 
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art of conducting small wars’, he wrote, ‘is to strive for the attainment of decisive 
methods’, which meant victory on the battlefield. (Callwell, 1896, p. 125.)  
On the other hand though, Lawrence preferred to achieve his objective by following 
Hart’s IA theory third and fourth axioms that stated that the line of least expectation 
should be chosen and exploited in order for securing success. Lawrence following 
calculations depict clearly this point. “One company of Turks firmly entrenched in 
open country could have defied the entire army of them; and a pitched defeat, with 
its casualties, would have ended the war by sheer horror. I concluded that the 
tribesmen were good for defense only but if we strengthened them by light 
automatic guns of the Lewis type, to be handled by themselves, they might be 
capable of holding their hills and serving as an efficient screen behind which we 
could build up, an Arab regular mobile column, capable of meeting a Turkish force 
(distracted by guerrilla warfare) on terms, and of defeating it piecemeal. They 
would eventually finish the war by striking while the tribesmen skirmished about, 
and hindered and distracted the Turks by their own pin-prick raids.” (Lawrence, 
1935, p. 89) In defeating the Turks, Lawrence was convinced that the most effective 
















-  CHAPTER 4 - 
CASE STUDY – WINGATE’S EXPEDITIONS IN 
SUDAN, PALESTINE, ETHIOPIA AND BURMA 
 
‘This man of genius who might well have become a man of destiny.’ 
(Letter from Winston Churchill to Mrs Wingate after Orde Wingate’s death. 1944) 
4.1 Birth of Wingate and signs of early eccentricity 
“What could be better than to be a dashing young British officer fighting deep 
behind enemy lines, disrupting lines of communications in uncompromisingly 
harsh territory? What T.E Lawrence achieved in the desert, Wingate would achieve 
in the jungle.” (Roberts, 2010, p. 10) Orde Wingate was born on 26th of February, 
1903, in Naini Tal, the summer capital of the United Provinces in the North of India. 
Coming from a family with deep military background, in an era in which some 
regiments of the British army took immense pride in its officers’ family 
connections, Orde was from a very early age inclined to follow in his ancestors’ 
steps. (Royle, 1995, p. 5) Despite his family’s military background, the other 
reasons that pushed Orde to pursue a military career were that he was academically 
uninspired, which resulted in his marks being placed near the bottom of every class 
he attended, while at the same time, Wingate’s parents made it clear to him, that 
they would be unable to support him financially after he finished school. (Royle, 
1995, p. 26) 
Wingate never failed in exhibiting his eccentric behavior, thus sewing for himself 
a veil of mixed enthusiasm and disgust among his senior and peer military 
colleagues.  A noteworthy incident is the one which Tulloch, (1972, p. 32) mentions 
in his book ‘Wingate in Peace and War’, in which Wingate was to be unofficially 
punished for exemplifying the behavior of disgraceful conduct. Instead of 
compliance to his punishment, which required him to run naked to a cold-water 
tank while being beaten by knotted handkerchiefs by his senior classmates, Wingate 
turned the humiliation against his punishers by walking defiantly through them 
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while staring at them with a dangerous look. Young Wingate exhibited from an 
early age that he was able to delve deep into the nature of power and use it to his 
own advantage by projecting it to his fellow men through his own personality. 
“Wingate was certainly a maverick with a reputation for eccentricity, yet he used 
the estimation as a cloak, because, being a zealot in a conformist society like the 
army, nothing would be expected of him, provided that he did not break the basic 
rules. More than that, throughout his life, he was a man of extremes who brooked 
no middle way. With Wingate, it had to be all or nothing.” (Royle, 1995, p. 4) 
4.2 First posting: Sudan 
Sir Reginald Wingate, a cousin of Orde’s father, was a retired army general who 
had been the governor of Sudan from 1899 to 1916. ‘Cousin Rex’ as Orde would 
regularly mention him, was an influential character over Wingate’s future career, 
especially in his Middle East postings. By 1928, Wingate’s application of 
transferring to the Sudan Defense Force was accepted, and he was posted near the 
borders of Ethiopia, where the Sudan Defense Force was patrolling in order to 
eliminate slave trading and ivory poaching. Orde was instrumental in redesigning 
patrolling strategies from that of traditional patrolling treks to ambushes. In a 
peculiar way, destiny was placing Wingate in a position that was not only suitable 
for him to practice his talent for unorthodox thinking and warfare, but at the same 
time, being initiated in the art of the bush-craft. These lessons served Orde 
exceptionally well in the conflicts that he would participate in the following years 
of his life. Royle (1995, p. 68) stresses this point when he states that: “However, 
the experience of trekking would leave a lasting effect not just on his personal 
development; it would also influence the way he viewed soldiering. Alone with his 
men in the wastes of the Dinder country he learned a number of useful lessons. The 
first was that, properly trained and motivated, small groups of men could learn to 
survive in a hostile environment. Second, they could operate in isolation far from 
home base provided that they were properly led and had faith in their commanders. 
Third, they had to be kept up to the mark and galvanized by constant training, the 
more realistic the better.” 
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4.3 Inventing new tactics for long-penetration operations 
One of the most important tactics that Wingate can be credited as the inventor, 
during his time in Sudan, was the use of aircraft as the means of supplying his small 
units with food and ammunition during long-penetration operations. This was made 
possible because of the invention of the hand-held radio communication devices 
which allowed ground troops to communicate their positions to aircraft, which 
would in their turn parachute the supplies near the ground troops. Wingate would 
march his infantry company 500 miles into remote areas of eastern Sudan, 
experimenting with ground-to-air control by working with RAF Squadron 47 (B). 
(Diamond, 2012, p. 10)  As a result, he was laying the foundations of an emerging 
tactic that he and future commands would utilize years later. (Diamond, 2012, p. 
10) 
4.4 Early utilization of the OODA Loop theory 
On the other hand, slave traders and poachers adapted by eluding the patrols that 
were following pre-determined paths in certain time frames of the day. It is at this 
stage that Wingate starts exhibiting his intellectual skillset. At this specific 
example, Wingate depicts the utilization of the OODA Loop theory. Since he knew 
that the poachers could elude his patrol in the Dinder’s brush if alerted, he devised 
tactics that depended on deception, surprise and selection of the best areas for 
ambushes. (Diamond, 2012, p. 10) Concluding that his opponents would try to 
adapt to his new tactic of ambushing, it is certain that he had already completed the 
OODA Loop faster than his opponents. This is suggested by his foreknowledge of 
how his opponents would react to his new tactic before he had already put his new 
tactics into action. 
When it came to achieving success on the battlefield, Wingate chose the way of 
offsetting his opponent by adapting his tactics and pre-setting his opponent’s mind, 
instead of choosing the traditional path of demanding new or different weaponry 
systems in order to defeat his enemy. The same mode of thinking is pointed out 
also by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (2007, p. 17) in their book ‘Unrestricted 
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Warfare’, who emphasize that: “However, a new concept of weapons is different. 
With technological developments being in the process of striving to increase the 
types of weapons, a breakthrough in our thinking can open up the domain of the 
weapons kingdom at one stroke. With regard to the flood of new-concept weapons, 
technology is no longer the main factor, and the true underlying factor is a new 
concept regarding weapons.” 
4.5 Posted in Palestine 
Orde returned on England in 1933 and stayed until 1936 in which he was posted in 
Palestine as an intelligence officer. By the time of his arrival in Palestine, 
Palestinian Arab guerrillas had begun a campaign of harassing attacks on Jewish 
communities and the British mandate officials. One of the favorite targets of the 
guerrillas were the pipelines of the Iraqi Petroleum Company. Once again, the 
British were simply keeping a steady flow of patrols across the length of the oil 
pipelines and the nearby villages which were usually used as the bases from which 
Arab guerrillas were staging their attacks from. Personal experience and the insight 
that Orde gained from his time in Sudan, led him straight to the office of Wavell, 
then commander of the British forces in Palestine, to whom he proposed the 
creation of small, mobile, light-armed units comprised of both British and Jewish 
personnel. Thus, the Special Night Squads were brought into existence. Orde, 
personally lead the Special Night Squads into enemy territory, setting ambushes 
and inflicting heavy losses to the Arab guerrillas thus leading to a reduction of 
damages and costs that the Iraqi Petroleum Company had to incur, previous to 
Orde’s counterinsurgency campaign. In achieving his aims, Orde listed the tactics 
to be used by his guerrilla squads: “never stick to a predictable route, never retrace 
a route, wear muted uniforms and cover all polished surfaces, develop hand signals 
for routine orders, create recognition signs for friendly aircraft, maintain fire 
discipline to prevent shooting at a fellow unit and, lastly, always try to imagine the 




4.6 Wingate and the application of Reflexive Control theory 
For the purposes of this study, we concentrate on the last part of his advice, on 
attempting to imagine the enemy’s intentions. Wingate’s counterinsurgency tactics 
favored primarily deception and surprise, as the core elements that had the potential 
to turn the tables against an opponent, if they were exploited skillfully. But 
Wingate’s reference to an attempt in dissolving the enemy’s intentions, depicts a 
much deeper understanding of how to achieve an objective in the battlefield. Sun 
Tzu, had commented on this specific subject stating that: “If you know the enemy 
and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Wingate’s 
thinking depicts that he had understood that if he knew his enemy’s intentions, it 
was possible for him not to simply react to those intentions effectively, but that he 
could take those necessary actions so that he could strategically ambush his 
opponent in the long term. 
Probably the best example of Wingate’s preliminary inception of what we have 
come to know today as the Reflexive Control theory is found in his following 
statement: “One of the commonest means of obtaining surprise in war is by the use 
of unexpected boldness, as for example the passage of a small body of troops 
through the middle of an enemy position. To sum up, it may be said that surprise is 
the greatest weapon of the guerrilla; that it is far easier for him to obtain surprise 
against the enemy than vice versa; that to obtain value for the surprise achieved the 
commander must think out carefully beforehand how he will exploit the enemy’s 
confusion.” (Royle, 1995, p. 173) As Wingate notes, the element of surprise is 
useless unless it is compounded by proactive thinking of how surprise will be 
utilized after it is obtained. For Wingate, setting up the surrounding environment 
for your opponent was crucial, in order to secure that by the skillful exploitation of 






4.7 Wingate’s legacy to Israel 
Unsurprisingly, as in the case of Liddel Hart, Wingate’s instructions on conducting 
war, were and still are, highly regarded by people of the Israeli military and political 
establishment. Sadeh, a veteran leader of the Haganah5 emphasized that what he 
had learned from Wingate, was that he could learn from textbooks how to lay an 
ambush or conduct a front-attack, but that was not enough for making you 
successful in war. What a soldier needed was to understand that each situation 
should be treated as it was a completely new situation. If every situation was treated 
like new, a soldier or a decision-maker would then try to solve it with a new 
approach. (Royle, 1995, p. 173) Wingate insisted that a successful solution to every 
emerging situation, could be obtained through the element of adaptability. The 
element of adaptability is a pillar upon which Hart’s IA theory rests. 
4.8 Wingate’s second posting in Sudan 
On the outbreak of World War II, Wingate, which was positioned in England, was 
invited by commander-in-chief of Middle East Wavell, to Sudan.  From Sudan, he 
was to organize operations against the Italians which occupied neighboring 
Ethiopia. In Sudan, Wingate organized a special task force comprised 
by British and African soldiers, which he named Gideon Force. Gideon Force 
which was comprised by fifty officers, forty British NCOs, 1000 trained Sudanese 
troops and 1000 partially-trained Ethiopian regulars, highlighted once again the 
effectiveness of unorthodox tactics when combined with psychological warfare, 
especially when it managed towards the end of the campaign to capture 20,000 
Italians and 14,500 Ethiopian troops. (Royle, 1995, p. 182) Royle (1995, p. 187) 
mentions that following Wingate’s Ethiopian campaign, Wingate quoted that: 
                                                          
5  “Haganah, (Hebrew: “Defense”), Zionist military organization representing the majority 
of the Jews in Palestine from 1920 to 1948. Organized to combat the revolts of Palestinian 
Arabs against the Jewish settlement of Palestine. Although it was outlawed by the British 
Mandatory authorities and was poorly armed, it managed effectively to defend Jewish 




“Given a population favorable to penetration, a thousand resolute and well-armed 
men can paralyze, for an indefinite period, the operations of a hundred thousand. 
While the means were different, this was certainly an argument which Lawrence 
would have understood.” Wingate stresses once again the importance of conducting 
psychological warfare against your opponent when he states that: “It is a problem 
of how to realize to the full the power we possess of producing great results with 
small means through bluff and propaganda.” (Royle, 1995, p. 197) As his 
predecessor Lawrence, Wingate came to the conclusion that the most effective 
method of defeating an adversary was through the use of psychological warfare, 
against the adversary’s logical reasoning process.  
With the surrender of the Italian occupation forces in Ethiopia, Wingate had proven 
himself a master in the art of deception, guerrilla and counterinsurgency tactics and 
the use of the indirect approach theory at the tactical level in order to secure victory 
in the strategic level. Wingate’s military exploits in Sudan, Palestine and Ethiopia 
did not fail to impress many of his superiors, not only about the tactics that Wingate 
had developed but also as what Diamond (2012, p. 56) remarks: “Wingate’s 
campaigns demonstrated traits of cunning and deception, coupled with a tendency 
towards the unorthodox.” 
4.9 Wingate and the Chindits 
Nevertheless, as Wingate had already proven manifold times earlier in his career, 
he was not only an exemplary leader in the battlefield but also a visionary of means, 
tactics and strategies which proved effective both in defeating his opponents but 
also in economizing valuable resources. Thus, by the time that Wingate was 
planning the second offensive of the Allied forces in Burma, he had “the absolute 
support of the Prime minister with the promise of further personal backing should 
problems be placed in his way.” (Royle, 1995, p. 270) 
Despite his mounting successive campaigns throughout his military career, which 
employed mostly unorthodox, unconventional tactics and strategies, the majority 
of Wingate’s superiors remained highly skeptical about whether the efficacy of 
Wingate’s campaigns was the result of good luck or a result of a higher form of 
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reasoning and intelligence. In March 1942, Orde was posted in the Far East and 
was ordered to organize guerrilla units that would fight Japanese in the jungle and 
behind their lines. The birth of the Chindits, the force that Wingate is most 
commonly associated with, was born in the Burmese jungle after a mythical 
Burmese lion, the chinthe.  
In the Far East front, Wingate was given the opportunity to test twice the validity 
of his long-penetration theories. As Wingate remarked in his memorandum (Forces 
of Long Range Penetration: Future Development and Employment in Burma) in 
1943: “Long Range Penetration affords greater opportunity of mystifying and 
misleading the enemy than any other form of warfare. It provides the ideal 
opportunity for the use of airborne and parachutist troops without risking their loss. 
This calls for the use of the best troops available. RAF sections operating with 
columns are in a position to direct our aircraft with great accuracy on targets 
invisible and undetectable from the air. Such is the description of the vast majority 
of enemy targets in South Eastern Asia. To sum up, LRGs should be used as an 
essential part of the plan of conquest to create a situation leading to the advance of 
our main forces.” (Royle, 1995, p. 267) Misleading and casting a veil of uncertainty 
inside the adversary’s mind was only one of the elements that constructed 
Wingate’s theory of the Long-Range Penetration. His previous experiences, had 
resulted in Wingate approaching war in a similar way that the Romans and the 
Byzantines were doing centuries ago. That was by bringing an opponent in a 
controlled battlefield, in which more opportunities presented for the initiator of 
events than for a passive opponent. 
In the Asian front, the Allies needed to retake Northern Burma in order to link the 
Ledo Road to the Burma Road and ensure an overland supply route from India to 
China through Northern Burma and Yunnan. The linkage between Allied forces in 
India and the Chinese forces in China would then permit the mounting of a major 
land air operation in Burma moving southward down the great river valleys of the 
Chindwin, the Irrawaddy and the Sittang, and hopefully forcing Japan out of 
Burma. The task of preparing the ground for the retaking of Northern Burma was 
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given to the Long-Range Penetration Groups, the Chindits and the Marauders. 
Because of the acknowledged difficulties of their task and the nature of the terrain, 
it was agreed that the campaigns of the Chindits and the Marauders across the 
mountains and jungles of Burma would be limited to ninety-days of front-line 
action. (Trager, 1961, pp. 62-63) 
Wingate professed that “modern war, was war of penetration in almost all of its 
phases.” Followingly, he acknowledged that there are two types of this war, tactical 
and strategical. Tactical penetration is where the armed forces that carry it out, are 
directly supported by the main armies’ operations. On the other hand, strategical 
penetration is where the armed forces that carry it out, are living and operating 100 
miles behind the enemy’s lines. According to Wingate though, strategical 
penetration pays by far the larger dividend on the forces that employ it. (Royle, 
1995, p. 235) 
In his turn, Asprey (1994, p. 425), commented that: “Wingate’s point was that the 
enemy was most vulnerable far beyond his lines. His proposal was to cut the 
enemy’s supply line, destroy his dumps, tie up troops unprofitable far behind the 
line in the endeavor to protect these vulnerable areas, and generally to help the army 
proper on to its objectives.” (Fergusson, date, p. 21) Conclusively, Wingate’s Long-
Range Penetration theory pointed that victory could be achieved by an indirect 
approach. In this case, the indirect approach translated into taking a series of 
preparatory steps that would create those required conditions that would secure 
victory in the long-term. Wingate’s Long-Range Penetration Groups utilized this 
approach tactically in the battlefield whereas at the same time, Long Range 
Penetration Groups were also being utilized strategically in order to create the 
necessary conditions that would secure a victory for the army that would follow the 





4.10 Synopsis of Wingate’s employment of Chaos theory, OODA Loop 
theory and Reflexive Control theory 
While Long Range Penetration Groups theory found many supporters, critics of the 
theory found it difficult to believe that the theory was coherent enough to be applied 
successfully in the battlefield. The answer though came from the interrogation of 
Japanese generals, after the war. They said that the difficulty of defending against 
Wingate’s raid led them to mount an offensive against India in 1944 in order to 
prevent future incursions. That attack failed and left them too weak to prevent the 
British recapture of Burma the following year. (Boot, 2013, p. 301) Such evidence, 
prove that Wingate’s calculations were correct. Wingate had managed through the 
use of the Chindits and the Marauders, to lure the Japanese into a strategic trap, a 
concept which was similar to the one that he had utilized so many times before in 
Sudan, Palestine and Ethiopia. Victory was secured when the Japanese had decided 
to mount their offensive against India in 1944, but this victory materialized only 
after the Japanese had incurred high casualties in Burma and had failed to recapture 
it.   
A closer observation of Wingate’s endeavors in Sudan, Palestine and Burma, 
reveals a growing strategic and tactical maturity of Wingate’s thinking. Wingate 
was always fighting opponents that were the majority of the times superior in 
numbers and technologically more advanced. In order to counter the advantages of 
his opponents, Wingate turned to devising new tactics and strategies. Wingate’s 
plans insisted primarily on mobility and speed of thought so that his little force 
could be concentrated rapidly at decisive places and times. (Royle, 1995, p. 200) 
Wingate’s insistence on mobility and speed of thought, reveal that Wingate had 
more than a rudimentary comprehension of the decision-making processes of his 
own but most significantly of his opponents. Since he had taken for granted that the 
battlefield and war was a phenomenon which abided primarily by chaos, Wingate 
was in search for alternative ways that would allow him to circumvent chaos. 
Although that he probably did not know it at the time being, Wingate was 
unconsciously but successively putting into practice the OODA Loop theory.  
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From Sudan to Burma, Wingate was always literally one step ahead of his 
opponents. How he managed to attain the edge over his opponents, was the product 
of the close observation of his opponents’ behavioral attitudes, tactics and 
strategies. Wingate was not simply observing his opponents’ tactics and strategies. 
If he had done only this, he would have failed to predict so accurately their 
responses when he put into actions his counterinsurgency tactics and strategies. His 
approach in observing his opponents was holistic, meaning that he observed 
specific patterns in the behavior of his opponents, which he then exploited. He 
possessed the charisma of understanding the logical reasoning processes of his 
opponents and that is why he was able to outperform them so successfully. Once 
Wingate had managed to deconstruct the logical reasoning processes of his 
opponents, he then proceeded in thinking on how they would react accordingly to 
different actions that he could take. Instinctively, Wingate followed methodically 
all of Hart’s IA theory axioms. In Sudan, his purpose was to defeat the poachers 
and he adjusted the tactics of his patrols by choosing and exploiting the line of least 
expectation, setting ambushes instead of patrolling. As a result, Wingate’s plan to 
countering poachers was flexible, so that his actions offered him alternative ways 
to attain his objective. On the other hand, poachers were deprived of the element of 
adaptability because their indecisiveness led them into a passive phase, in which 
they were simply responding to Wingate’s actions. About the same pattern of 
thinking and action with minor modifications, can be discerned in Wingate’s 
endeavors in Palestine and Burma. In not a single operation did Wingate try to attain 
his objective by using brute force or confronting his opponents directly. He favored 
to observe his opponent, orient and decide how he could attain his objective even 
by utilizing his own weaknesses and then act rapidly. He firstly dislocated his 
enemy and then he exploited the dislocation of his enemy so that he could attain 






-  CHAPTER 5 - 
ANALYSIS OF THE INDIRECT APPROACH THEORY AS 
THE SYNERGISTIC RESULT OF CHAOS THEORY, 
OODA LOOP THEORY AND REFLEXIVE CONTROL 
THEORY 
 
An operation of war cannot be thought out like building 
a bridge; certainty is not demanded, but genius, 
improvisation and energy of mind must have their parts. 
(Winston Churchill. 1942. Quoted by Michael Howard in Grand Strategy-History 
of the Second World War, Vol. 4, p. 295.) 
 
5.1 Hart’s inception of the Indirect Approach theory 
Hart’s conception of the IA theory appeared in an era of conformity regarding 
military affairs and especially the conduct of warfare. The inception though of the 
IA theory was a result of a process which recent research has named lateral 
thinking. DeBono (1992, p. 87), author of the book ‘Serious Creativity’ notes that 
lateral thinking is: “Seeking to solve problems by unorthodox or apparently 
illogical methods.” Both Lawrence’s and Wingate’s actions, depict that they 
followed unorthodox methods in order to solve the problems that arose during their 
endeavors. Despite the fact that the army favored conventionality and conformity 
to rules, especially during the era of the leading figures of the case studies, 
nevertheless, the element of creativity played an instrumental role in the 
construction and the application of the IA theory in the campaigns of both Lawrence 
and Wingate. 
Following a similar path to the ones that had practiced the IA theory throughout 
history, Hart came upon two conclusions. Firstly, that no general is justified in 
launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position and 
secondly, that instead of seeking to upset the enemy’s equilibrium by one’s attack, 
it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully, launched. (Hart, 
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1965, Vol I, pp. 162-165) Both of Hart’s conclusions were ahead of their era, as the 
traditional way of conducting warfare was heavily influenced by Clausewitz’s 
principles such as that of direct confrontation at the enemy’s strongest point of 
resistance.  
In this chapter, an attempt will be undertaken to compare and contrast between the 
two case studies that have been included in this research project, in order to 
demonstrate that the IA theory can be formed, from the synergy of Chaos theory, 
the OODA Loop theory and the Reflexive Control theory. Additionally, key lessons 
from the case studies will be related to other historical or contemporary examples, 
so as to allow the reader an in-depth comprehension of the analysis undertaken.   
5.2 The principle of economy of force  
J.F.C. Fuller once remarked that all the principles of war could be subsumed under 
the principle of economy of force. (Murray and Mansoor, 2012, p. 141) Thornton 
(2007, p. 162) emphasized the importance of how force is employed, especially in 
today’s battlefields. He pointed out that today’s trend revolves around the concept 
of having a military which prefers solving warfighting problems through the 
employment of technology instead through intellect. Greene, supports Thornton’s 
argument by noting that: “Armies that seem to have the edge in money, resources, 
and firepower tend to be predictable. Relying on their equipment instead of on 
knowledge and strategy, they grow mentally lazy. When problems arise, their 
solution is to amass more of what they already have. But it is not what you have 
that brings you victory, it is how you use it.” In 1632, an expert 
Japanese swordsman and rōnin, named Miyamoto Musashi, wrote in his seminal 
book ‘The Book of Five Rings’ that: “Generally speaking, fixation and binding are 
to be avoided, in both the sword and the hand. Fixation is the way to death, fluidity 
is the way to life. This is something that should be well understood.” (p. 28) What 
Musashi failed to address, is that fixation of the mind is even more destructive. 
Greene also points out this issue poignantly. Technologically superior countries 
become mentally stagnant allowing their opponents to become naturally more 
inventive. As a result, these technologically outdated opponents, learn more, 
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become more adaptable, and outsmart their powerful adversaries. Time becomes 
the ally for the weakest. (Greene, 2006, p.50)  
The concept of economy of force had also been examined by Hart, for which he 
concluded that: “Economy of force and deterrent effect are best combined in the 
defensive-offensive method, based on high mobility that carries the power of quick 
riposte.” (1941, p. 172) Almost half a century later, Rosen (1991, p. 113) would 
also argue in his book ‘Winning the Next War-Innovation and the Modern Military’ 
that: “The ideal concept of operations would be a defensive-offensive one that 
forced the enemy to wear himself out by attacking prepared defenses.” During the 
examination of the two case studies in chapters three and four, the concept of 
mixing defense with offense was more than discernible. This concept lies at the 
heart of the IA theory. Moreover, the efficacy of the concept of merging defense 
with offense which has also been detected by Sun Tzu in his book ‘Art of War’, is 
identified throughout the course of military history. A historical example that 
exhibits the use and the effectiveness of this ideal concept of defense-offense in 
practice, is that which Boot (2013, p. 22), offers in his book ‘Invisible Armies - An 
epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present’. “In 139 BC 
the Romans arranged for the murder of one of the most troublesome rebel leaders 
in Hispania, which they valued for its silver and gold mines. Virianthus, a shepherd 
who became the leader of a guerrilla army, had inflicted one setback after another 
on the legions during the preceding eight years. Operating from mountain 
strongholds, he perfected a tactic beloved of primitive warriors everywhere: he 
would pretend to flee from Roman forces in order to draw them into an ambush. 
This stratagem paid of in 146 BC when his Lusitanian tribesmen, armed with spears 
and curved swords, managed to kill four thousand Romans out of an army of ten 
thousand.” 
5.3 Economy of force applied by Roman and Byzantine generals  
Explicitly, a closer examination of the tactics and strategies that the most successful 
Roman generals favored, reveals that the IA theory was regarded as the epitome of 
military skill and proficiency, despite the fact that none of theory’s practitioners 
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came in designating it a specific term.  Asprey (1994, pp. 22-23), references the 
case of the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus which was tasked with the 
interception of Carthaginian general Hannibal. “For months, Fabius shadowed 
Hannibal’s marches. ‘harassing his foragers, cutting off stranglers, nipping off a 
stray patrol, but never permitting himself to be drawn into full-scale battle.’ 
Impatient Romans derisively called him ‘the Laggard’; history has treated him more 
kindly by acknowledging him as the inventor of Fabian tactics. Such tactical 
adaptation was rare in the West, and almost always was forced by the enemy rather 
than produced voluntarily by a commander trained to think in terms of either the 
unexpected or the indirect approach based on cunning.”  
Faithfully abiding to their Roman roots in terms of military thinking, the Eastern 
Roman Empire’s generals utilized a variety of stratagems and tactics that depict a 
strong preference towards the employment of the IA theory. ‘On Shadowing 
Warfare’, a handbook of defensive warfare, published in 965 AD, after emperor’s 
Nikephoros Phokas request, that would help guide Byzantine generals counter the 
incursive raids made by Moslem general, Sayf al-Dawla, provides evidence of 
sophisticated military thinking produced by almost continuous offensive and 
defensive wars. Like Sun Tzu’s book, Art Of War, other literary works of Byzantine 
emperors such as Maurice and Leo, form an interesting contrast to Western thinking 
of the time. Asprey, (1994, p. 34) also underlines the vast difference in Eastern and 
Western military philosophy at that time: “…Courage was considered at 
Constantinople as one of the requisites necessary for obtaining success, not as the 
sole and paramount virtue of the warrior. The generals of the East considered a 
campaign brought to a successful issue without a great battle as the cheapest and 
most satisfactory consummation in war. They considered it absurd to expend stores, 
money, and the valuable lives of veteran soldiers in achieving by force an end that 
could equally well be obtained by skill…They had a strong predilection for 
stratagems, ambushes, and simulated retreats. For the officer who fought without 




5.4 Merging defense with offence 
In both case studies examined in this research, Lawrence and Wingate exhibited a 
strong preference in combining defense and offense, in order to attain their 
objectives. Lawrence run the Arab Revolt campaign in the same line that Fabius 
shadowed Hannibal’s march to Rome, harassing the Turkish army and posts, but 
never allowing himself to be drawn in a direct confrontation with the Turks. 
Wingate on the other hand preferred to ambush his opponents at both the tactical 
and the strategic level. At the tactical level, Wingate’s patrols ambushed the 
poachers and the Arab insurgents in Sudan and Palestine, whereas in Ethiopia and 
in Burma, his forces ambushed at the strategical level, Italian and Japanese forces 
respectively. Once again, in all of Wingate’s warfare endeavors, there is are no 
signs of Wingate allowing himself to come into direct confrontation with his 
opponents. On the contrary, both Lawrence and Wingate utilized offense and 
defense in combination, in order to lure their opponents in an environment that 
maximized opportunities for victory for themselves, whereas it minimized 
opportunities of success for their opponents. The concept of combining offense 
with defense lies at the heart of the IA theory because it is the practical way for 
attaining dislocation and exploitation, the two principles that Hart identified as 
crucial for the success of the IA theory.  
5.5 The utilization of Chaos theory, OODA Loop theory throughout the 
case studies  
Following the examination of evidence taken from the two case studies, it can be 
concluded that both Lawrence and Wingate opted firstly to dislocate their 
opponents and secondly to exploit this dislocation. The phase of dislocation was 
achieved by Lawrence, by utilizing chaos theory and the OODA Loop theory, 
whereas in the case of Wingate’s endeavors, chaos theory does not seem to be 
utilized at the same extent as in the case of the Arab Revolt. This observation is a 
result primarily drawn from Lawrence writings, in which multitude of times he 
refers to the element of unpredictability and chance. On the other hand, whereas 
Wingate seems to ignore chaos as a significant factor in the conduct of warfare, 
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literary evidence show that he was inclined in using imagination and creativity in 
order to be able to deconstruct the unpredictable. As a result, it can be concluded 
that although Wingate did not acknowledge directly the existence of chaos in war, 
he seemed to value both its existence and its significance. The OODA Loop theory 
though is utilized in Wingate’s exploits. The most interesting part of the IA theory 
was when both Lawrence and Wingate had already managed to dislocate their 
adversaries. Once dislocation was achieved, the application of the IA theory 
transforms from an unconscious act into a deliberate and clearly discernible strategy 
as it enters the phase of exploitation. It is in the phase of exploitation that extensive 
use of the Reflexive Control theory can be observed, in both case studies. 
The perspective that Greene offers on the IA theory, runs parallel to the approach 
of this research. Greene (2006, p. 78) states that unless you take the indirect route 
to your goal, you face the danger of losing the initiative, thus finding yourself 
constantly reacting to what the other side does. The solution Greene suggests, is to 
plan ahead but also to plan subtly, so that you prevent your opponent from seeing 
the purpose of your actions in the long-term. The concept proposed by Greene is 
closely linked with the OODA Loop theory that has been suggested in this research 
and it appears in both case studies recurrently. Both Lawrence’s and Wingate’s 
actions advocate that taking the initiative is a decisive factor for the success of an 
operation. Assuming the initiative in these two cases, is different from the 
traditional meaning that accustoms the term. Normally, assuming the initiative 
means moving from inactivity into action, either unintended or unplanned. In our 
case studies, Lawrence and Wingate did not take the initiative by simply moving 
from inactivity into action. The difference is that both of the leading figures of these 
case studies, took the initiative deliberately and after they had meticulously planned 
ahead. What made their plans durable and coherent was the use of the OODA Loop 
theory by both Lawrence and Wingate.    
The OODA loop theory describes four sequential phases. Observe-Orient-Decide-
Attack. (Coram, 2002, p. 344) In the phase of Observation, the user gathers as much 
raw information as it is available, by using a variety of sensory systems. The 
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quantity of gathered raw information is not of much importance though. In the 
Orient phase, the user processes the information and focuses on what he considers 
the most important and valuable information. For the Decide phase, the user decides 
on what actions should be undertaken, always taking into consideration the quality 
of information that he possesses. The final phase, that of Attack is the more 
practical aspect in which decisions that were made in the previous phase are 
implemented as fast as possible. 
OODA loop’s value is usually disregarded as oversimplified but its value is 
understood when some of its attributes are taken into consideration. The loop’s four 
phases do not work only in conjunction with each other but they are individual 
components of a dynamic system. This means that each phase of the OODA loop 
consists of another never-ending loop. In essence, when, the cycle of each phase is 
completed, the process starts again. Additionally, when the OODA loop is 
completed, the cycle will start again from the beginning. The speed in which the 
OODA loop is applied is the most significant element of the OODA loop. As Boyd 
himself also remarks for the OODA loop “In order to win, we should operate at a 
faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries--or, better yet, get inside the 
adversary's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop...Such 
activity will make us appear ambiguous and unpredictable, thereby generate 
confusion and disorder among our adversaries since our adversaries will be unable 
to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster 
transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against.” (Coram, 2002, p. 328) 
Musashi had come to the same conclusion in 1632 when he wrote that “In large 
scale military science, this means that you assess adversaries minds on the 
battlefield and use the power of your knowledge of the art of war to manipulate 
their attention, making them think confusing thoughts about what you are going to 
do. It means finding a rhythm that will fluster adversaries, accurately discerning 
where you can win.” (Musashi, 1632, p. 65) Musashi, who wrote four centuries 
earlier than Boyd, also noted that: “When an opponent is startled and the feeling of 
opposition is distracted, the opponent will experience a gap in reaction time.” 
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(Musashi, 1632, p. 105) As a result of this gap in reaction time, Greene notes that 
the opponent is at a severe disadvantage. (Greene, 2006, p.107) 
By utilizing the OODA Loop theory faster than their opponents, both Lawrence and 
Wingate managed to bring their opponents at disadvantageous positions. The gaps 
in reaction time that the opponents of Wingate and Lawrence experienced also 
allowed Lawrence and Wingate to delve deep into their opponent’s minds. Once 
they had reached this stage, Lawrence and Wingate could easily plan on how to 
dislocate their adversaries. What the adversaries of Wingate and Lawrence failed 
to understand, was the importance of the element of time, in the conduct of warfare. 
As Greene (2006, p. 67) records: “Retreat in the face of a strong enemy is a sign 
not of weakness but of strength. By resisting the temptation to respond to an 
aggressor, you buy yourself valuable time-time to recover, to think, to gain 
perspective. Let your enemies advance; time is more important than space.” Ellipsis 
in comprehension of the role that time performs in an information satiated 
environment, is also revealed by Thornton (2007, p. 135) who notes specifically 
that asymmetric opponents generally think and act at a faster pace than large, 
ponderous forces, thus making asymmetric opponents difficult to defeat. Lawrence 
and Wingate seem to have instinctively understood the importance of time against 
space, and that is why both of them always chose to retreat and allow their 
adversaries to gain territorial space, which for Lawrence and Wingate translated in 
gaining valuable time for their decision-making processes. 
5.6 Ardant Du Picq, Mao tse-Tung and the element of deception 
Ardant Du Picq, (1921, p. 13) a French Army officer and military theorist of the 
mid-nineteenth century argued that: “To conquer is to be sure to overcome. In fine, 
it is the mind that wins battles, that will always win them, that always has won them 
throughout the world’s history.” Mao Tse-tung (1989, p. 23) had also alluded to 
this point when he remarked that: “The enemy is deceived and again deceived. 
Attacks are sudden, sharp, vicious, and of short duration. Many are harassing in 
nature; others designed to dislocate the enemy’s plans and to agitate and confuse 
his commanders. The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of 
65 
 
far more importance than the bodies of his troops.” Lawrence’s Arab Revolt and 
Wingate’s campaigns in Sudan, Palestine, Ethiopia and Burma proved Du Picq’s 
and Mao Tse-tung’s observations correct, as it is a fact that both Lawrence and 
Wingate fought successfully against quantifiably superior forces.   Boot (2013, p. 
42) has also identified the paradox of how the weak can defeat the strong as the 
‘nomad paradox’. Yet, the explanation which Boot suggests for the success of the 
guerrilla paradox is that, it lies largely in the use of hit-and-run tactics emphasizing 
mobility and surprise, making it difficult for the stronger to bring its full weight to 
bear. Boot’s explanation though is only half-correct. Mobility and surprise cannot 
guarantee victory. Mobility and surprise are simply the tools, by which dislocation 
of the enemy is achieved.  
Wingate regularly stressed the effectiveness of the element of deception. Lawrence 
did also acknowledge the importance of deception in the conduct of war. In the 
examination of our two consecutive case studies, both Lawrence and Wingate 
though made extensive use of the psychological effect of priming their opponents, 
which is a phenomenon far more complex than deception. Priming is the process 
by which the primer, places its victim in an environment that is totally controlled 
by the primer. Parallelly, the primer blinds the victim by allowing the victim’s mind 
to subdue itself by the buildup of an illusionary feeling of security and self-
confidence in the victim’s decision-making process. In the case studies examined 
above, the opponents of both Wingate and Lawrence, were by all accounts more 
powerful than the task forces of Wingate and Lawrence. Lawrence and Wingate 
were aware of this but instead of being deterred, they also knew that: “the most 
powerful are always the most susceptible to deception, since, whether they realize 
it or not, power breeds arrogance, and arrogance blinds the powerful to things they 
do not wish to see.” (Thornton, 2007, p. 67) As a result, Lawrence and especially 
Wingate proceeded in building an environment that offered their opponents 





5.7 Tactical defeat transformed into strategic victory 
The pattern of offering your opponent opportunities of tactical success that in the 
long-term evolve into strategic failures, is another version of the defense-offense 
concept. In the case of the Arab Revolt, Lawrence did not pursue exactly this 
method but on the other hand he persisted in using the broader version of the 
defense-offense concept. Wingate on the contrary favored the technique of luring 
his opponents in a position in which they acquired tactical superiority in the short 
term and then transformed his adversary’s success into a strategic failure in the long 
term. This concept was demonstrated especially during the Burma campaign, in 
which Wingate’s Chindits were tactically defeated by the Japanese in the Burmese 
jungle but succeeded in the long-term as the Japanese failed to conquer Burma 
during their campaign the following year. This pattern, has also been observed after 
the conclusion of WWII for the German military. Despite the fact that the Germans 
had superior tactics and had been more successful than the Allies at the tactical and 
operational levels of the war, they were defeated at the strategic level, thus losing 
the war.  
5.8 The phenomenon of priming 
In the case of the Arab Revolt, Lawrence had primed the Turks and their Germans 
advisors by allowing them to endorse the hubristic belief that power is a strength 
and can never be turned into a vulnerability. (Thornton, 2007, p.23) This is clearly 
depicted by Lawrence’s observation during the Arab Revolt in which he remarked 
that: “The Turks were stupid; the Germans behind them dogmatical. They would 
believe that rebellion was absolute like war, and deal with it on the analogy of war. 
Analogy in human things was fudge, anyhow; and war upon rebellion was messy 
and slow, like eating soup with a knife.” (Lawrence, 1935, p. 182-183) Wingate 
had done the same thing in all of his campaigns. In Sudan and Palestine, he had 
engraved on the minds of the poachers and the Arab guerrillas that his patrols 
timeframes and routes were rigid. Misleading them from the beginning, Wingate 
transformed the tactic of patrolling into ambushing. 
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Fixation in terms of thinking in a dynamic environment, such as the one that warfare 
represents, guarantees only one result, and that is nothing more than failure. Ulysses 
S. Grant, victorious leader of the Union Army over the Confederacy in the 
American Civil War commented on the dangers that are presented when a mental 
obsession casts its veil over the mind. In his own words: “Some of our generals 
failed because they worked out everything by rule. They knew what Frederick did 
at one place, and Napoleon at another. They were always thinking about what 
Napoleon would do…. I don’t understand the value of military knowledge, but if 
men make war in slavish observance to rules, they will fail. War is progressive.” 
(Ulysses S. Grant quoted by Greene, 2006, p. 13) In supporting Grant’s conclusion, 
Liang and Xiangsui (2007, p. 182), note that the golden rule, is that of asymmetry, 
in which: “Apart from the effectiveness it displays when used, asymmetry in itself 
is a rule of action suggested by the golden rule. Of all rules, this is the only one 
which encourages people to break rules so as to use rules.” Success in the conduct 
of warfare is not guaranteed by following a pre-determined line of action. Success 
can only be attained by meticulous planning and by continuous adaptation over the 
developing circumstances.  
Julius Caesar, quoted in 75 BC that: “The greatest enemy will hide in the last place 
you would ever look.” DeBono’s (1992) research on creative thinking has 
concluded that as humans, we are hermetically impervious to decoding what is 
actually happening, even when we have the capability of having all the relevant 
information on the subject that troubles us at the time being. “Sometimes creativity 
is needed even in information analysis. The mind can only see what it is prepared 
to see.” (DeBono, 1992, p. 397) Both Lawrence and Wingate seem to have 
acknowledged the phenomenon of mind fixation, thus being able to successfully 
manipulate their opponents actions. 
5.9 Propaganda, another tool for priming 
In the book ‘Propaganda-The Formation of Men’s Attitudes’, Ellul (1965, pp. 86-
87) strains exactly this point of subconscious oblivion of the situational awareness 
of any situation by giving the following example: “After having read an article on 
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wheat in the US or on steel in the Soviet Union, does the reader remember the 
figures and statistics, has he understood the economic mechanisms, has he absorbed 
the line of reasoning? If he is not an economist by profession, he will retain an over-
all impression, a general conviction that ‘these Americans or Russians are 
amazing…They have methods…Progress is important after all, and so on.’ 
Thereafter, what remains with the individual affected by this propaganda is a 
perfectly irrational picture, a purely emotional feeling, a myth. The facts, the data, 
the reasoning-all are forgotten, and only the impression remains. And this is indeed 
what the propagandist ultimately seeks, for the individual will never begin to act on 
the basis of facts, or engage in purely rational behavior. What makes him act is the 
emotional pressure, the vision of a future, the myth. The problem is to create an 
irrational response on the basis of rational and factual elements. That response must 
be fed with facts, those frenzies must be provoked by rigorously logical proofs. 
Thus, propaganda in itself becomes honest, strict, exact, but its effect remains 
irrational because of the spontaneous transformation of all its contents by the 
individual. We emphasize that this is true not just for propaganda but also for 
information. Except for the specialist, information, even when it is very well 
presented, gives people only a broad image of the world. This claim may seem 
shocking; but it is a fact that excessive data do not enlighten the reader or the 
listener; they drown him.” 
Conclusively, both Lawrence’s and Wingate’s greatest achievements in the conduct 
of warfare, were not their successes but it was the way by which they achieved their 
successes. Both of them avoided direct confrontation with their adversaries but 
chose the indirect approach. It was by far much more effective to dislocate their 
opponents by directing them in attacking prepared defenses. Both Lawrence and 
Wingate had shown that they acknowledged the existence and the importance that 
chaos performed in the conduct of war, thus putting themselves in search of a tool 
that would allow them to deconstruct chaos and weaponize it in their favor. This 
tool, they found in the form of the OODA Loop theory. Operating the OODA Loop 
theory at a faster tempo than their opponents, Lawrence and Wingate were both 
capable of observing ‘inside’ the aperiodic patterns of evolving situations, and as 
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such, entering inside the mind of their opponents. Instead of reacting to their 
opponent’s actions, they aimed at taking the initiative by controlling their 


























-  CHAPTER 6 – 
        EPILOGUE 
 
6.1 Examining the first theoretical hypothesis 
The two theoretical hypotheses that were set in the introduction chapter of this 
research were:  
1) Are the principles of dislocation and exploitation yielded by the synergy of 
Chaos theory, OODA theory and Reflexive Control theory? 
 
2) Can the idea of victory be fractal to the concept of the state of equilibrium?  
Concerning the first hypothesis, the principles of dislocation and exploitation, that 
Hart pointed as the pillars upon that the IA theory rests, are undeniably yielded by 
the synergy of Chaos theory, OODA Loop theory and the Reflexive Control theory. 
The result of the synergy produced by these three theories has been shown in 
chapters three, four and also in the analysis that followed in chapter five. This 
research has tried to approach the IA theory from a completely new approach, that 
combined the method of comparative historical analysis with the insertion of 
scientific theories that would help deconstruct the IA in an easy to follow way. The 
combination of these three theories, in order to decipher the IA theory has never 
been done before. Another point that should be pointed out, regards the theories 
involved in this research.  Excepting the OODA Loop theory, the theories of 
Reflexive Control and Chaos have yet to be sufficiently researched, especially those 
possible connections that these theories might hide, with regard to ways of 
conducting warfare. Research, that most likely will be conducted in the near future, 
concerning these two theories and their application in the way warfare is conducted, 
will reveal further elements of the theories, granting us further deconstruction and 




6.2 Future prospects of Chaos theory  
Besides the aperiodic patterns concept that was drawn from Chaos theory, and was 
used in this research for the purpose of showing that chaos is actually organized, 
there are many other aspects of Chaos theory that need to be explored. As it was 
mentioned in this research, deeper comprehension of Chaos theory resulted in the 
improvement of the financial system and specifically the way stock exchanges are 
conducted. The same has been done in weather predicting, another field that 
primarily deals with Chaos theory. Theoretically, focused research on the 
connection of Chaos theory with the conduct of warfare, or possibly the 
weaponization of chaos will yield, yet to be undiscovered concepts and 
possibilities. 
6.3 Future prospects of Reflexive Control theory  
Concerning the theory of Reflexive Control, this research has exposed one of the 
weaknesses of this theory. The theory of Reflexive Control is undeniably a tool 
with great potential when it comes to being used in warfare. Its only weakness 
though is that Reflexive Control can only be utilized after the dislocation of the 
enemy. It is for this reason that Reflexive Control theory was found compatible 
with Chaos theory and the OODA Loop theory. This research has also concluded 
that under any other circumstances, the chances of independent utilization of 
Reflexive Control theory successfully, decrease exponentially. Regarding the IA 
theory, Reflexive Control theory carries out the application of the second principle 
which is the exploitation of the enemy’s dislocation, but Reflexive Control theory 
is ineffective if not used in accordance with other compatible theories such as the 
ones suggested in this research. 
6.4 Future prospects of OODA Loop theory  
Successively, the OODA Loop theory remained the only theory that provided the 
necessary linkage between Chaos theory and Reflexive Control theory, in the 
process of deconstructing the IA theory. It is important to note that the OODA Loop 
theory was originally conceived by Boyd, a man coming from military background, 
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which aspired to discover a formula that would allow its user to overcome its 
opponent. Although the primary application of the formula he came up with, was 
for aerial dogfights, it soon became apparent that the concept of the OODA Loop 
theory could be applied in land and naval warfare accordingly. Even more 
interestingly, as more people became accustomed to the OODA Loop theory, the 
theory found its way into the corporate world. Corporations and especially giant 
enterprises had discovered in the OODA Loop theory, a tool that enabled them to 
overcome their opponents in the races of market dominance. As it was mentioned 
above, the OODA Loop theory was used in the context of this research as the 
connecting rod between Chaos theory and Reflexive Control theory, emphasizing 
the importance of time in the decision-making process. From another perspective 
though, further research of the OODA Loop theory could further unveil the 
interaction between human psychology and the OODA Loop theory, a point which 
would have been of great interest, as it was noted multiple times in this research 
that war still remains a phenomenon in which the human element is fundamental. 
Everything that has been developed, either in the material or the immaterial world, 
it was firstly incepted through the power of the mind. Either through experience or 
through the mechanisms of creativity, the mind regularly surprises us by allowing 
us to exceed our own expectations and limitations. Despite the fact that the IA 
theory has been conceived and recorded as a conception by Hart, it has remained 
locked in the drawers of those who conduct state policy and most significantly those 
who conduct war. The IA theory never reached the position that it deserved in the 
podium of history. It simply remained a theory. As Lawrence wrote in a most 
revealing letter to Hart in 1933: “With 2000 years of examples behind us we have 
no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well.” (Asprey, 1994, p. 190-191)  
Throughout this research project, I have to admit that blinded by my own 
preconceptions, I was obsessed with discovering the secret formula that would 
make its user, indestructible in war. Even if I had managed to succeed in my quest 
of the formula, what transfixed my attention was Hart’s reflection in his book ‘Why 
Don’t We Learn From History’. He observed that “We learn from history that 
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complete victory has never been completed by the result that the victors always 
anticipate: a good and lasting peace. For victory has always sown the seeds of a 
fresh war, because victory breeds among the vanquished a desire for vindication 
and vengeance and because victory raises fresh rivals.” (Hart, 1944, p. 83) 
6.5 Examining the second theoretical hypothesis 
Regarding the answer of the second theoretical hypothesis, this can be found in 
Hart’s observation of war’s unavoidability. Victory is an illusion, only a state of 
metastability. The state of metastability is what chaos theorists and physicists 
define as any other stable state of a dynamical system other than the system's state 
of least energy. Those who conduct war, should always keep that in mind. Those 
who understand the core of the human nature, clearly comprehend that victory in 
war, even when attained, is short-lived. It is with these observations in mind that 
this research came in borrowing the term from physics, a state of equilibrium. With 
the introduction of atomics physics, it became known that an atom is the smallest 
particle of an element. Ernest Rutherford had established in 1911 that the mass of 
the atom is concentrated in its nucleus. He had also proposed that the nucleus was 
positively charge and that it was surrounded by negatively charged electrons. 
(Atomic Archive, 2017) Atomic structure suggests that the nucleus which is 
composed of protons and neutrons is inactive when a state of equilibrium exists 
between the electric charges of protons, neutrons and the surrounding electrons. 
This state of equilibrium is disrupted only when there is an increase or decrease of 
the number or the charge of neutrons or protons that consist the nucleus, or an 
increase or decrease of the number or the charge of the electrons surrounding the 
nucleus. By comparison to this analogy, the phenomenon of war should be viewed 
as the condition of increase-decrease of the number or the charge of either the 
neutrons, protons or the electrons. The phenomenon of war then, would only lead 
to a state of metastability. Parallel to the never-ending process of reaching 
equilibrium in the science of physics, in the real world, the phenomenon of war 
fulfills the same objective. War is an intermediate phase that always results in a 
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metastable state. As a result, the concept of victory would only be a fractal to the 
state of equilibrium. 
This point was also shortly stressed in chapter five. Theorists agree that war is 
usually conducted at three levels, the strategic, the operational and the tactical. The 
sum of victories at the tactical level or the operational level though, do not 
guarantee victory at the strategic level. It is he who secures victory at the strategic 
level that secures complete victory. The issue with the term of complete victory is 
that in reality, there has never been a complete victory. Although it seems that 
nobody has yet touched this subject, the phenomenon of war, exceeds its three 
levels, reaching much furtherer. A victorious war, is not a guarantee of long-term 
success. On the contrary though, examples of history show that victory can become 
a self-blinding mirage. Although it might have already been presumed that the 
second theoretical hypothesis is disengaged from the concept of the IA theory, this 
is not the case.  
It is the comprehension of the concept of victory being fractal to the state of 
equilibrium that makes the IA theory so thought-provoking. The IA theory is 
essentially based upon the concept of victory being a fractal of the state of 
equilibrium. The IA theory does not stress victory as the most important outcome 
of war. On the contrary, Hart’s IA theory focuses on achieving a state of 
equilibrium between opposing forces, through the subversion of the opponent’s will 
and mind to an illusionary long-term prospect. Hart (1944, p. 87) reflected on the 
same subject when he commented on Wellington’s way of conducting warfare, 
stating that: “He was the least militaristic of soldiers and free from the lust of glory. 
It was because he saw the value of peace that he became so unbeatable in war. For 
he kept the end in view, instead of falling in love with the means. Unlike Napoleon, 
he was not infected by the romance of war, which generates illusions and self-
deceptions. That was how Napoleon had failed and Wellington prevailed.” 
As Hart had observed after the end of both World Wars, the concept of absolute 
war did not serve well its utilizers in achieving either their military or political 
objectives. This came as a result of the influence of Clausewitz’s maxims on the 
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way war was conducted. Even though Clausewitz had emphasized that war was 
simply a continuation of politics, absolute war, the style that was applied during 
both World Wars, led to a reversal of the relationship between war as a continuation 
of politics. As a result, the result of the war, determined future policies. The IA 
theory though, provided the opportunity of correcting this reversal, and setting once 
again, the phenomenon of war as a tool of implementation of policies. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Finally, perhaps the most vital element of the IA theory, lies not in the prescription 
of how to conduct warfare successfully, but in that it can be applied to all levels of 
war and extend beyond those into policy itself. For the IA theory’s most significant 
attributes, are its compatibility and applicability at the different levels of war and 
policy. The IA theory is equally efficient when used at the tactical, operational or 
strategic levels of war. It is also efficient when used in policy-making. The true 
value of the IA theory does not degrade as the theory is utilized at different levels. 
This was remarked in chapter five. In the process of analyzing the IA theory, it was 
found that the theory which was favored by primitive warriors, had also been 
successfully employed by Roman generals and later on by Byzantine emperors, 
confirming that the theory was usable at both the military and political levels of a 
state’s administration. 
Hart came to the conclusion that: “There is no panacea for peace that can be written 
out in a formula like a doctor’s prescription. But one can set down a series of 
practical points; elementary principles drawn from the sum of human experience in 
all times.” (1944, p. 90) Perhaps the only viable option, for humanity to discard the 
phenomenon of war, is by following Plato’s advice of “until either the rulers 
became philosophers or the philosophers became the rulers, the affairs of mankind 
would never go right.” (1944, date, p. 96) Human history though testifies against 
the possible eclipse of the phenomenon of war from humanity’s future. 
Nevertheless, this should not deter us from improving the way we conduct warfare. 
The Indirect Approach theory offers us the opportunity to achieve the objectives 
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that we set in an enlightened way. It has been in existence and in successful practice 
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